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INTERPRETING INJUNCTIONS
F. Andrew Hessick* and Michael T. Morley**
Injunctions are powerful remedies. They can force a person to act or
refrain from acting, dictate policies that the government must adopt, or
even refashion public institutions. Violations of an injunction can result
in contempt.
Despite the importance of injunctions, courts have applied an
astonishingly wide range of contradictory approaches to interpreting
them. They have likewise disagreed over whether appellate courts
should defer to trial courts’ interpretations or instead review those
interpretations de novo. Virtually no scholarship has been written on
these topics.
This Article proposes that courts apply a modified textualist approach
to injunctions. Under this scheme, courts would generally interpret
injunctions according to the ordinary meaning of their language. When
a provision in an injunction quotes or incorporates by reference an
extrinsic legal authority, such as a statute or contract, however, courts
would interpret that provision according to the methodology they would
ordinarily apply to that extrinsic authority. This proposed approach
ensures that injunctions provide regulated parties with adequate notice
of the conduct proscribed, curtails judicial abuses of power, and aligns
tightly with the procedural rules that govern injunctions in both federal
and state courts.
This Article further proposes that appellate courts review trial courts’
interpretations of injunctions de novo. Independent appellate review
naturally aligns with the textualist goal of implementing the best
reading of an injunction, promotes principles of notice, and prevents
government overreach.

* Judge John J. Parker Distinguished Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of
North Carolina School of Law.
** Associate Professor, Florida State University (FSU) College of Law. The authors are
grateful for helpful feedback and suggestions from Sam Bray, Richard Fallon, Carissa
Hessick, Doug Laycock, Leigh Osofksy, and Caprice Roberts, as well as the participants at
the Notre Dame Law School Remedies Roundtable and 2018 Southeastern Association of Law
Schools Remedies Discussion Group.

1059

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1060

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 107:1059

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 1060
I. THE CURRENT APPROACH TO INTERPRETING INJUNCTIONS ...... 1066
A. Primer on Injunctions ..................................................... 1066
1. Awarding Injunctions................................................ 1067
2. Enforcing Injunctions ............................................... 1072
B. The Challenge of Interpreting Injunctions ..................... 1074
1. Textualism ................................................................. 1074
2. Purposivism .............................................................. 1076
3. Intentionalism ........................................................... 1080
4. Pragmatism ............................................................... 1081
II. USING TEXTUALISM TO INTERPRET INJUNCTIONS ................... 1082
A. Supporting a Textualist Approach to Interpreting
Injunctions .................................................................... 1083
1. Notice ........................................................................ 1084
2. Preventing Arbitrary Exercises of Power ................. 1088
3. Consistency with Rule 65 and State Counterparts ... 1090
B. Objections ....................................................................... 1091
1. Achieving the Purpose of an Injunction.................... 1092
2. The Risk of Overly Broad Injunctions ...................... 1093
3. The Nature of an Injunction ...................................... 1094
III. REFINING THE SCOPE OF THE PROPOSAL................................ 1095
A. Extrinsic Legal Authorities ............................................. 1096
B. Extending the Theory to All Types of Injunctions........... 1100
1. Permanent v. Interlocutory Injunctions .................... 1100
2. Injunctions v. Consent Decrees ................................ 1101
C. Non-Textual Considerations at the Remedial Stage....... 1104
IV. APPELLATE REVIEW OF TRIAL-COURT INTERPRETATIONS .... 1106
A. Promoting Textualism’s Goals ....................................... 1107
B. Against Deference........................................................... 1109
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 1112
INTRODUCTION
Injunctions are one of the most powerful remedies in the law.1 They
dictate behavior; parties who disobey injunctions face the prospect of
contempt.2 Over the past century, injunctions have grown only more
1

F.W. Maitland, Equity 254 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1929).
Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826–27 (1994)
(discussing the distinction between criminal and civil contempt); see also Joseph Moskovitz,
2
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powerful, evolving into new forms such as structural injunctions3 and
nationwide injunctions.4 For these reasons, ascertaining the precise
meaning of an injunction is critically important. Parties need to know
what conduct an injunction requires or prohibits, and courts must be able
to determine whether an injunction has been violated.
There is significant inconsistency, however, in how courts interpret
injunctions. Courts at every level have employed a wide range of
methods, including textualism, purposivism, intentionalism, and
pragmatism. These different theories can easily lead to inconsistent
interpretations of identical injunctions. The lack of a uniform approach to
interpreting injunctions has also contributed to disagreement among
appellate courts as to whether to defer to trial courts’ interpretations of
such orders. Some appellate courts review trial courts’ interpretations of
injunctions de novo, while others apply more deferential standards of
review.5 Deference makes more sense under some interpretive regimes
than others.
One reason for this disarray is that theories of interpretation for
injunctions are surprisingly underdeveloped. In contrast to the extensive
bodies of work that discuss various approaches to interpreting the

Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 780, 780–81 (1943)
(explaining that the “distinction” between civil and criminal contempt “is made decisive in
such vital matters as parties, procedure, evidence, judgments, and review”).
3
See Owen M. Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction 4–5 (1978).
4
See Michael T. Morley, Disaggregating the History of Nationwide Injunctions: A
Response to Professor Sohoni, 72 Ala. L. Rev. 239 (2020) (explaining how nationwide
defendant-oriented injunctions are a relatively recent phenomenon); see also Samuel L. Bray,
Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 440 (2017)
(tracing the rise of nationwide injunctions in the 1960s).
5
Compare Abbott Labs. v. TorPharm, Inc., 503 F.3d 1372, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(“[I]nterpretation of the terms of an injunction is a question of law we review de novo.”), with
In re Managed Care, 756 F.3d 1222, 1234 (11th Cir. 2014) (concluding that a court should
give “great deference” to a judge’s interpretation of an injunction that he entered).
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Constitution,6 statutes,7 regulations,8 contracts,9 and wills,10 virtually
nothing has been written about the proper method for interpreting
injunctions.11 Injunctions present several considerations that do not arise
with regard to other legal instruments. For example, unlike statutes that
typically apply to groups of people or entities, or even the general public,
injunctions operate as targeted laws, imposing coercive legal obligations
on particular named parties and their associates. Moreover, in contrast to
virtually every other type of legal document, an injunction is typically
interpreted by the same person—the trial judge—who entered the
injunction in the first place.12
At first glance, these considerations do not uniformly point toward a
single theory of interpretation. For example, on the one hand, one might
support a purposivist approach to interpretation because injunctions are
typically both drafted and interpreted by the same court. An injunction’s
author is in the best position to know the goals she was trying to
accomplish and the most effective ways to promote them. On the other
hand, because injunctions are targeted at particular individuals, a
6

See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (2011); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional
Construction: Divided Power and Constitutional Meaning (1999); Raoul Berger, Government
by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1997); Robert H. Bork, The
Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990).
7
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (2d ed. 2018); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Interpreting Law: A Primer on How to Read Statutes and the Constitution (2016); Robert
A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014).
8
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 Geo. L.J. 1613 (2019); Kevin M. Stack,
Interpreting Regulations, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 355 (2012).
9
See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Interpreting Contracts via Surveys
and Experiments, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1753 (2017); Richard A. Posner, The Law and
Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1581 (2005).
10
See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, A Pluralist Approach to Interpretation: Wills and Contracts,
42 San Diego L. Rev. 533, 534 (2005); Joseph Warren, Interpretation of Wills—Recent
Developments, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 689 (1936).
11
No article specifically focuses on the unique interpretive concerns that injunctions raise.
Professor Timothy Jost analyzed some of those issues in his work on modifying injunctions.
See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in
the Federal Courts, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1101, 1104–05 (1986). Other pieces have briefly touched
on the topic as it arises in particular contexts, such as abstention, see Matthew D. Staver, The
Abstention Doctrines: Balancing Comity with Federal Court Intervention, 28 Seton Hall L.
Rev. 1102, 1137–38 (1998), and anti-gang injunctions, see Beth Caldwell, Criminalizing Dayto-Day Life: A Socio-Legal Critique of Gang Injunctions, 37 Am. J. Crim. L. 241, 280–81
(2010).
12
See, e.g., Steven Seidenberg, Fast-Forward: Federal Circuit Makes It Easier to Enforce
Injunctions in Patent Cases, 17 ABA J. 16, 16 (Aug. 2011) (“[A] contempt proceeding is
usually heard by the same judge who issued the injunction . . . .”).
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textualist approach would limit abusive enforcement by constraining the
court’s ability to impose sanctions.
This Article recommends two main principles to guide the
interpretation of injunctions. First, it proposes that courts adopt a modified
textualist approach to interpreting injunctions. Under this proposal, a
court would construe most provisions within an injunction according to
the ordinary meaning of their language.13 A textualist approach ensures
adequate notice to individuals subject to the injunction; reduces
opportunities for judicial abuse of the contempt power; and is most
consistent with both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), which
requires an injunction to “state its terms specifically,”14 as well as its state
analogues. Although a textualist approach presents the risk that
individuals might try to circumvent injunctions by skirting the bounds of
the prohibited conduct, courts can address this problem by modifying
injunctions when necessary to prohibit such actions. This proposal
reduces the risk of arbitrary or vindictive enforcement while still
providing courts with flexibility to tailor injunctions over time to address
unforeseen problems.15
We call the proposal “modified” textualism because we recognize an
exception under which courts should depart from a pure textualist
approach. Injunctions often draw on other legal authorities, such as
statutes or contracts, that courts may interpret using approaches other than
textualism. This Article proposes that a court should construe provisions
within an injunction that quote or incorporate by reference an extrinsic
13
For seminal discussions of textualism in statutory interpretation, see John F. Manning,
Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Manning,
Equity], and John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419 (2005)
[hereinafter Manning, Textualism].
14
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(B).
15
In making this textualist proposal, we do not seek to engage with objections to the entire
endeavor of textualism, such as whether the ordinary meaning of language can be derived
without considering purpose driving that language. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Problems
of Jurisprudence 22–69 (1990); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Statutory Interpretation Muddle,
114 Nw. U. L. Rev. 269, 279 (2019); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 340–45 (1990). Instead, we rely
on the work of the many others who have established that it is generally possible to determine
the “ordinary meaning” of language independent of the lawmaker’s intent or purpose. See,
e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70,
79 (2006) (arguing that ordinary meaning can be derived by reading text through the lens of a
“community’s shared conventions”); Jeremy Waldron, Legislators’ Intentions and
Unintentional Legislation, in Law and Interpretation 329, 339 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995)
(arguing that shared conventions inform the meaning of language).
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legal authority according to the interpretive theory it would ordinarily
apply to that type of authority. In contrast, when a provision restates or
paraphrases an extrinsic legal authority in the issuing court’s own
language—and especially when the provision imposes prophylactic
protections that go beyond the requirements imposed by that extrinsic
authority—the court should apply a textualist interpretation. Although
this approach loses some of the benefits of notice and constraint provided
by textualism, it maintains consistency and coherence in the interpretation
of those other legal authorities.16
Furthermore, although courts should apply a modified textualist
approach in determining what an injunction means, non-textualist
considerations should still play an important role in determining the
proper remedy for violations. Not all violations of injunctions require
contempt. A court has broad discretion to decline to hold a violator in
contempt, for example, where that person’s conduct was only a technical
violation of the injunction or did not undermine the injunction’s purpose.
A court may likewise refuse to impose contempt sanctions when they
would be against the public interest. Permitting courts to consider
purposivist factors at the remedy phase would preserve a textualist
approach to interpreting the terms of the injunction itself while capturing
some of the benefits of non-textualist methods of interpretation.
Second, this Article argues that appellate courts should not defer to trial
courts’ interpretations of injunctions. Plenary review naturally aligns with
the textualist premise that an injunction’s text has a single, best legal
meaning. De novo review also tends to ensure notice to the regulated
parties by limiting the ability of an injunction’s author to enforce her
unexpressed intentions or underlying purposes. And it prevents judicial
abuses more effectively than deferential review by creating a greater
degree of oversight.
Moreover, the standard justifications for appellate deference do not
warrant a more limited standard of review for trial judges’ interpretations

16
In other contexts, courts will sometimes apply special treatment to a legal provision that
quotes an extrinsic legal authority. For example, courts generally apply Auer deference to
agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations, except for regulations that merely reiterate
statutory provisions. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256–57 (2006) (stating that
deference under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), does not extend to agency rules that
merely quote statutes).
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of injunctions.17 Legislatures have not passed sweeping laws that either
grant trial courts unique judicial authority over the interpretation of
injunctions or require appellate courts to defer to them. Furthermore, trial
courts do not have special expertise in determining the ordinary meaning
of language; an appellate court is just as capable as a trial court of
resolving such issues. Indeed, the characteristics that would make a trial
judge an expert on an injunction’s meaning—being the judge who
presided over the proceedings that led to the injunction and originally
entered it—are precisely the same factors that create the greatest risk of
abuse and accordingly counsel against deference.
Part I of this Article begins by explaining the fundamentals of
injunctions, describing how they are entered and enforced. It then
examines the wide range of interpretive methods courts have used to
interpret them.
Part II begins building the case for a modified textualist approach to
interpreting injunctions. It explains that textualism better promotes the
values of providing notice and constraining government action than other
methods of interpretation. It goes on to show that textualism also aligns
well with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and analogous state
provisions that require courts to clearly specify the terms of injunctions.
This Part then addresses three major objections to a textualist approach.
One is the practical argument that textualism makes it easier for parties to
circumvent injunctions. Another is the prudential objection that a
textualist approach may lead judges to enter unnecessarily broad
injunctions to avoid such circumvention. Finally, this Part considers the
philosophical argument that textualism is inapt because the “law” created
by the injunction is really the intent of the drafter, and the terms of the
injunction are merely evidence of that intent.
Part III more fully explores the contours of our proposal. It begins by
suggesting that, although courts generally should interpret injunctions
based on textualist principles, they should construe provisions in an
injunction that quote or incorporate extrinsic legal authorities according
to the interpretive methodologies the court would apply to those
authorities in other contexts. This Part goes on to show why this modified
textualist approach is appropriate not only for permanent injunctions, but
for all other types of injunctions—including temporary restraining orders,
17

See Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1061, 1078 (2008)
(identifying the two broad categories of justifications for deference: legal authority and
epistemic authority).
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preliminary injunctions, and consent decrees—as well. Finally, this Part
recognizes that, although courts should adopt modified textualism to
interpret injunctions, they still may consider non-textual factors in
exercising their discretion as to whether to hold violators in contempt.
This approach provides clarity about the meaning of an injunction, while
mitigating some of the potential harshness of textualism by permitting
courts to opt against punishing all violations of the text.
Part IV turns from the question of how to interpret injunctions to the
issue of who should have power to ultimately determine their meaning.
Building on the arguments developed in earlier Parts, it argues that
appellate courts should determine the meaning of injunctions de novo,
rather than mechanically adopting or deferentially reviewing trial courts’
interpretations.
I. THE CURRENT APPROACH TO INTERPRETING INJUNCTIONS
This Part lays a foundation for the rest of the Article. It begins by
providing an overview of injunctions and then discusses the various rules
and doctrines that affect how courts interpret them.
A. Primer on Injunctions
An injunction is an equitable civil remedy. It is a judicial order
commanding a person to take, or refrain from taking, a particular action.18
Its purpose is to prevent a plaintiff from suffering irreparable harm—harm
that cannot be adequately remedied by damages or some other legal
remedy.19
Injunctions come in various forms. A permanent injunction is an
injunction awarded after a trial to regulate the defendant’s conduct
indefinitely.20 Courts may also award interlocutory injunctions to prevent
18
Injunction, Black’s Law Dictionary 520 (10th ed. 2014); 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 1
(2004) (“An injunction is a judicial order requiring a person to do or refrain from doing certain
acts.”).
19
The heart of the ongoing debate over nationwide injunctions—more properly called
“defendant-oriented injunctions”—concerns whether a court must tailor an injunction to
protect only the rights of the plaintiffs before it, or instead may expand the order to protect the
rights of third-party non-litigants as well. See Michael T. Morley, Disaggregating Nationwide
Injunctions, 71 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 28–29 (2019).
20
See, e.g., Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 606 (N.D.
Cal. 1983) (after a trial, permanently enjoining road construction in portions of a national
forest), aff’d in part, vacated in part 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), rev’d sub nom. Lyng v. Nw.
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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irreparable harm from occurring while a case is pending.21 There are two
types of interlocutory injunctions. The first is a preliminary injunction,
which a court may issue to protect a plaintiff’s rights for the duration of
the case until it decides whether to issue a permanent injunction.22 A court
may enter a preliminary injunction only after providing all parties an
opportunity to be heard.23 The second type of interlocutory injunction is
a temporary restraining order (TRO). A TRO is an emergency injunction
that a court may award ex parte to prevent immediate, irreparable injury
from occurring before the court has the opportunity to entertain a request
for a preliminary injunction.24 Courts may also enter consent decrees,
which are injunctions based on the agreement of the parties.25
1. Awarding Injunctions
Plaintiffs with meritorious claims are not automatically entitled to
injunctive relief. For example, to obtain a permanent injunction for a
federal claim in federal court, a party must not only prevail on the merits
but also show that:
(i) injunctive relief is necessary to prevent irreparable injury,
(ii) no adequate remedy at law exists,
(iii) the harm it will suffer without an injunction exceeds the hardship that
an injunction would impose on the defendant, and
21
See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (“Our frequently reiterated
standard requires plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is
likely in the absence of an injunction.”).
22
Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (“The purpose of a preliminary
injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits
can be held.”); accord Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1945 (2018) (per curiam); see
Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-In Effect of Preliminary Injunctions, 66 Fla. L. Rev. 779, 817
(2014) (“When a preliminary injunction is granted, it merely preserves the status quo long
enough for a decision to be reached on the merits . . . .”); Morton Denlow, The Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal Standard, 22 Rev. Litig. 495, 507 (2003)
(“Generally there are three purposes for granting a preliminary injunction: (1) maintaining the
status quo, (2) preserving the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision, and (3)
minimizing the risk of error.”).
23
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1).
24
See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1) (authorizing TROs “without . . . notice to the adverse
party” if the movant establishes that “immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard”).
25
Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 522 (1986)
(explaining that a consent decree draws its force from “the agreement of the parties, rather
than the force of the law upon which the complaint was originally based”).
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(iv) the injunction is consistent with the public interest.26
The requirements for obtaining a preliminary injunction or TRO are
similar.27 Courts have broad discretion in considering and weighing these
factors to determine whether to grant relief.28 Consent decrees, in contrast,
generally rest primarily on the parties’ consent.29
Courts also have broad discretion in fashioning the scope of an
injunction. At one end of the spectrum, a court can issue a narrow
injunction that prohibits the defendant from taking a specific action that

26

eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). These standards are only
presumptive; Congress may change or eliminate them for a particular federal cause of action
through clear statutory language. See Michael T. Morley, Enforcing Equality: Statutory
Injunctions, Equitable Balancing Under eBay, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2014 U. Chi.
Legal F. 177, 190–94 [hereinafter Morley, Enforcing Equality]. Many states have similar
standards for granting injunctions, see 43A C.J.S. Injunctions, supra note 18, § 42 (listing
various states imposing similar requirements), although state courts may interpret and apply
them differently than federal courts, see Michael T. Morley, Beyond the Elements: Erie and
the Standards for Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions, 52 Akron L. Rev. 457, 465–68
(2018) [hereinafter Morley, Beyond the Elements].
27
See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987) (noting the
close relationship between the standards for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief); see
also 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 8, Westlaw (database updated 2021). To obtain a preliminary
injunction, a party must show that he is “likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in
his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The only differences between this standard and the requirements for
permanent relief are that the plaintiff must show only a likelihood of success on the merits
rather than actual success, and the court need not separately consider whether an adequate
remedy at law exists. Id. The requirements for obtaining a TRO and a preliminary injunction
are the same, except the plaintiff seeking a TRO must also demonstrate that circumstances
made it impracticable or impossible to notify opposing counsel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1);
S. Cagle Juhan & Greg Rustico, Jurisdiction and Judicial Self-Defense, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev.
Online 123, 126 (2017) (“[W]hen considering motions seeking TROs, courts use the same
factors as for PIs . . . .”).
28
See Winter, 555 U.S. at 32 (“An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion.”); Abbott
Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967) (“[I]njunctive and declaratory judgment remedies
are discretionary . . . .”). Because trial courts have such broad discretion concerning
injunctions, appellate courts typically review both the decision to enter such orders, as well as
their scope, only for abuse of discretion. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366
U.S. 316, 323 (1961). Nevertheless, on some occasions, appellate courts have engaged in
detailed line-by-line parsing of lengthy injunctions, adjusting them as required to ensure their
validity, see, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 410–35 (1945).
29
In Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 525–26, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a federal court
may enter a consent decree if it has jurisdiction over the case, the decree “come[s] within the
general scope of the case made by the pleadings,” it “further[s] the objectives of the law upon
which the complaint was based,” and it does not affirmatively require “unlawful” action.
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the court concludes is unlawful. At the other end, a court can issue a
broad, prophylactic injunction that prohibits the defendant from engaging
in otherwise legal conduct, if the court believes that such broader scope
is necessary to prevent a continuation or “revival” of the defendant’s
illegal activity, or to otherwise protect the plaintiff’s rights.30 For
example, to prevent one person from harassing another, a court could
enter a narrow injunction specifically prohibiting such harassment. Or the
court could instead issue a broader order prohibiting the defendant from
coming within 200 feet (or some other distance) of the plaintiff if it
concludes that the buffer zone is necessary to prevent either harassment
or disputes over whether particular interactions constituted harassment.
Along the same lines, to prevent circumvention, a court may prohibit
not only the specific types of illegal acts that the defendant committed in
the past but also other acts “of the same type or class” as the offending
behavior.31 For example, if a court determines that it should enjoin a
person from playing the radio too loudly, the court can extend the
injunction to prohibit playing the television and other sources of noise too
loudly, as well.32
Of course, there are limits on the breadth of an injunction that a court
may enter. Courts award injunctions to remedy legal wrongs. Although a
court may enter a prophylactic injunction that goes beyond prohibiting
only unlawful conduct, the injunction still must be tied to the legal wrong

30
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 461 (1940); accord FTC v. Nat’l
Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 430 (1957) (“[T]he Court is obliged not only to suppress the unlawful
practice but to take such reasonable action as is calculated to preclude the revival of the illegal
practices.”); see also Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and
Definitional Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 Buff. L. Rev. 301, 314 (2004) (“[T]here
are two definitive attributes of the prophylactic remedy: it is (1) injunctive relief with a
preventive goal, (2) that imposes specific measures reaching affiliated legal conduct that
contributes to the primary harm.”).
31
Such broader relief is especially appropriate when the defendant has engaged in knowing
and intentional wrongdoing. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 89–90 (1950)
(holding that people who willfully violate the law “call for repression by sterner measures than
where the steps could reasonably have been thought permissible”).
32
Courts may also use injunctions to “cure the ill effects of the illegal conduct” by
prohibiting the defendants from profiting from, or enjoying other benefits of, their past illegal
activities. Id. at 88–89. For example, an injunction may cancel a contract executed as the result
of a price-fixing conspiracy, even though the parties might have entered into the same contract
without violating antitrust laws. See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S.
707, 724 (1944).

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1070

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 107:1059

proved by the plaintiff. A court cannot, for example, enjoin “all possible
breaches of the law,” or even of an entire statute.33
Both federal and state law require courts to draft injunctions with
specificity to ensure that parties understand their obligations. Typical is
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, which requires a court to “state the
reasons” it issues an injunction.34 Moreover, the injunction must “state its
terms specifically” and “describe in reasonable detail” the acts restrained
or required.35 As one treatise puts it, an “ordinary person reading the

33
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905); see NLRB v. Express Publ’g Co.,
312 U.S. 426, 435–36 (1941) (“[T]he mere fact that a court has found that a defendant has
committed an act in violation of a statute does not justify an injunction broadly to obey the
statute,” when that statute prohibits conduct “unlike and unrelated to that with which he was
originally charged.”). That said, some precedent suggests that when the Government wins an
injunction against violations of federal statutes, it should get the benefit of the doubt about the
proper scope of the order to ensure the law is adequately enforced. Local 167, Int’l
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 299 (1934) (“In framing [the
injunction’s] provisions doubts should be resolved in favor of the Government and against the
conspirators.”); accord Hartford-Empire, 323 U.S. at 409 (suggesting that a court may
“resolve all doubts in favor of the Government” in framing injunctions).
34
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(A). Forty-four states have promulgated provisions comparable
to Federal Rule 65. See Ala. R. Civ. P. 65; Alaska R. Civ. P. 65; Ariz. R. Civ. P. 65; Ark. R.
Civ. P. 65; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 65; Colo. R. Civ. P. 65; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-206;
Del. Ch. Ct. R. 65; Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610; Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-65; Haw. R. Civ. P. 65; Idaho
R. Civ. P. 65; 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-101; Ind. R. Trial P. 65; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60906; Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.02; La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 3605; Me. R. Civ. P. 65; Md. R. 15502; Mass. R. Civ. P. 65; Minn. R. Civ. P. 65.04; Miss. R. Civ. P. 65; Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 92.02;
Mont. Code Ann. § 27-19-105; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-1064.01; Nev. R. Civ. P. 65; N.H.
Sup. Ct. R. 48; N.J. Ct. R. 4:52-4; N.C. R. Civ. P. 65; N.D. R. Civ. P. 65; Ohio R. Civ. P. 65;
Okla. Stat. tit. xii, § 12-1386; Or. R. Civ. P. 79; R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 65; S.C. R. Civ. P.
65; S.D. Codified Laws § 15-6-65(d); Tenn. R. Civ. P. 65.02; Tex. R. Civ. P. 683; Utah R.
Civ. P. 65A; Vt. R. Civ. P. 65; Wash. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 65; W. Va. R. Civ. P. 65; Wyo. R.
Civ. P. 65. Of the other six states, five—Iowa, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and
Wisconsin—have adopted similar requirements by common law. 205 Corp. v. Brandow, 517
N.W.2d 548, 552 (Iowa 1994); Jacquin v. Pennick, 49 A.2d 769, 772 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982);
Rollins v. Commonwealth, 177 S.E.2d 639, 642 (Va. 1970); Dalton v. Meister, 267 N.W.2d
326, 330 (Wis. 1978); see also 67A N.Y. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 167 (2021) (gathering cases
describing New York’s specificity requirement for injunctions). Only New Mexico appears
not to have adopted specificity requirements.
35
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(B)–(C). Wright, Miller, and Kane’s treatise contends that the
“requirement of ‘reasonable detail’ appears to be repetitious of the specificity requirement.”
11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure
– Civil § 2955 (3d ed. 2013). Whether an injunction is sufficiently clear depends on a holistic
reading of the order. An otherwise vague provision in an injunction may provide adequate
notice when read in conjunction with the order’s other provisions. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc.
v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 126 (1948) (noting that potentially vague provisions in an
injunction must be “read . . . in light of the other paragraphs of the decree”).
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court’s order should be able to ascertain from the document itself exactly
what conduct is proscribed.”36
According to the Court, these provisions require “explicit notice of
precisely what conduct is outlawed,” both to “avoid the possible founding
of a contempt citation on a decree too vague to be understood”37 and to
facilitate appellate review.38 The Court has urged courts to be especially
careful to use “clear and guarded language” when drawing prophylactic
injunctions against otherwise permissible conduct.39 Still, despite Rule
65(d)’s specificity requirements, the Court has on occasion tolerated some
ambiguity on the grounds that parties may petition the issuing court to
modify or construe unclear terms in the injunction for them.40
Courts may modify or dissolve the injunctions they issue.41 A
modification or dissolution may be appropriate when the circumstances
that prompted the court to issue the injunction change, the injunction

36

Wright et al., supra note 35, § 2955; see also 13 William Moore, Federal Practice – Civil
§ 65.60[3] (“A court must frame its injunctions or restraining orders so that those who must
obey them will know precisely what the court intends to forbid or require.”). Rule 65 further
provides that an injunction binds only the parties to a case, their officers and agents, as well
as third parties acting in concert with them, if they have notice of it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2).
One of the authors has argued that Rule 65(d)(2) is a substantive rule that exceeds the
judiciary’s rulemaking authority under the Rules Enabling Act, but the principles it codifies
are consistent with both traditional equitable principles as well as the law of nearly all states.
Morley, supra note 19, at 49 n.277.
37
Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974); see also Wright et al., supra note 35, § 2955
(explaining that this specificity requirement is “designed to protect those who are enjoined by
informing them of what they are called upon to do or refrain from doing in order to comply
with the injunction or restraining order”).
38
Schmidt, 414 U.S. at 477.
39
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 296 (1941).
Interestingly, the Court has also suggested, “[A] judge himself should draw the specific terms
of such restraint and not rely on drafts submitted by the parties.” Id.
40
Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 10, 15 (1945) (upholding validity of an
injunction which specified that it applied not only to the named respondent but its “successors
and assigns” as well, because “[i]f defendants enter upon transactions which raise doubts as
to the applicability of the injunction, they may petition the court granting it for a modification
or construction of the order”); see also McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192
(1949) (upholding broad injunction in part based on respondents’ ability to “petition[] the
District Court for a modification, clarification or construction of the order”); United States v.
Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 188 (1944) (suggesting that the “burden” of an
injunction drafted in “general” terms can be “lightened by application to the court”).
41
See N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 967 (2d Cir.
1983) (Friendly, J.) (“The power of a court of equity to modify a decree of injunctive relief is
long-established, broad, and flexible.”).
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proves to be unduly burdensome, or the injunction is ineffective at
achieving its purpose.42
2. Enforcing Injunctions
Courts enforce injunctions through contempt.43 Contempt may be
criminal or civil.44 The nature of the contempt is determined by “the
substance of the proceeding and the character of the relief that the
proceeding will afford.”45
Criminal contempt punishes violations of injunctions46 and is intended
primarily to “vindicate the authority of the court.”47 Criminal contempt is
a criminal offense.48 In determining the proper penalty for criminal
contempt, courts will consider the gravity of the violation, whether it was
deliberate, the nature of the consequences, and the importance of
deterring similar violations in the future.49

42

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) (allowing a court to grant relief from an order when “applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable”); see Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367,
383 (1992) (“[A] party seeking modification of a consent decree bears the burden of
establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the
decree. . . . [and] the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed
circumstance.”); cf. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932) (holding that a
district court may modify an antitrust consent decree upon a “clear showing of grievous wrong
evoked by new and unforeseen conditions”); see generally 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 288,
Westlaw (database updated 2021) (summarizing the circumstances under which courts may
modify or dissolve injunctions).
43
Gunn v. Univ. Comm. to End War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S. 383, 389 (1970) (“An injunctive
order is an extraordinary writ, enforceable by the power of contempt.”).
44
See Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 443 (1986).
45
Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 (1988).
46
Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994)
(explaining that contempt sanctions may “punish a prior offense”).
47
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911).
48
Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632. Accordingly, defendants in criminal contempt proceedings are
entitled to the same constitutional protections that apply in other criminal prosecutions. Id.
(holding, in a contempt case, that “criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who
has not been afforded the protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal
proceedings”). For example, defendants in criminal contempt proceedings have the rights to a
jury trial (unless the punishment will be six months or less), Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194,
210 (1968); to an attorney, Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925); and to have the
prosecution prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632; Gompers, 221
U.S. at 444; see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Resource Manual § 754 (2012).
49
United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 303 (1947).
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Unlike criminal contempt, civil contempt does not seek to punish
disobedience.50 Instead, it aims either to force the violator to compensate
those harmed by the violation (“compensatory contempt”)51 or to coerce
the person violating the injunction to comply with it (“coercive
contempt”).52 When used in the former way, the contempt order operates
similar to a tort claim for damages.53 Such orders must correspond to the
complainant’s “actual loss.”54 By contrast, when used to force compliance
with an injunction, a civil contempt order may impose harsh measures,
such as fines or imprisonment, until the contemnor agrees to obey the
underlying order.55 In choosing a coercive contempt remedy, the court
must “consider the character and magnitude of the harm threatened by
continued contumacy, and the probable effectiveness of any suggested
sanction in bringing about the result desired.”56 Once the contemnor has
obeyed the underlying injunction, the court must lift a civil contempt
order.57

50

42.

51

Id. at 332 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441–

See Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 443 (1986)
(citing United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 303–04).
52
Id.; Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994) (“The
paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction . . . involves confining a contemnor
indefinitely until he complies with an affirmative command such as an order to pay alimony,
or to surrender property ordered to be turned over to a receiver, or to make a conveyance.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
53
Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 838 (stating that courts may use the compensatory contempt power
to “enter broad compensatory awards . . . through civil proceedings”); Doug Rendleman,
Irreparability Resurrected?: Does a Recalibrated Irreparable Injury Rule Threaten the Warren
Court’s Establishment Clause Legacy?, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1343, 1379, 1390 (2002).
54
United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 304.
55
Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441–42. Although civil contempt may result in these harsh
sanctions, fewer protections apply because it is not a criminal remedy. See Turner v. Rogers,
564 U.S. 431, 442 (2011) (“[W]here civil contempt is at issue, the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause allows a State to provide fewer procedural protections than in a criminal
case.”); Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827 (holding that “[n]either a jury trial nor proof beyond a
reasonable doubt” is necessary for imposing “civil contempt sanctions”).
56
United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 304.
57
Turner, 564 U.S. at 442 (“[O]nce a civil contemnor complies with the underlying order,
he is purged of the contempt and free.”); see also Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442 (explaining that
the respondent “can end the sentence and discharge himself at any moment by doing what he
had previously refused to do”).
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B. The Challenge of Interpreting Injunctions
Enforcing injunctions requires interpretation.58 To determine whether
to hold a person in contempt under an injunction, a court must assess what
the injunction means and whether the person has violated it.59 A court also
must interpret an injunction in determining whether to expand or contract
its coverage. Courts have not agreed on a single approach to ascertaining
injunctions’ meaning, however. Over the years, they have variously
applied textualism, purposivism, intentionalism, and pragmatism to
interpret injunctions.
1. Textualism
Textualism requires a court to interpret legal documents according to
the ordinary meaning of their text, read in context.60 The central question
under a textualist approach is how a reasonable person would understand
an injunction’s text.61 As Justice Scalia put it, “first, find the ordinary
meaning of the language in its textual context; and second, using
established canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear
indication that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one
applies.”62 Under a textualist approach, a person may not be held in
contempt unless her conduct violates the language of the injunction itself.
An early example of using textualism to interpret an injunction comes
from the English Court of Chancery decision in Marquis of Downshire v.
Lady Sandys.63 The issue, in that case, was whether chopping down fir
trees violated an injunction against chopping down trees “standing or

58

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”); Antonin Scalia & Bryan
A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 53 (2012) (“Every application of
a text to particular circumstances entails interpretation.”).
59
1 Charles Fisk Beach, Jr., Commentaries on the Law of Injunctions § 261, at 272 (1895)
(“[W]hether or not there has been a breach of an injunction must often turn upon the scope of
its terms.”).
60
See Manning, Textualism, supra note 13, at 434 (stating that “modern textualists” look to
the “ordinary meaning” of words and phrases, as well as “the relevant linguistic community’s
(or sub-community’s) shared understandings and practices”).
61
Manning, supra note 15, at 76 (explaining that textualism counsels a court to interpret
legal writings based on how “a reasonable person would use language under the
circumstances”).
62
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63
(1801) 31 Eng. Rep. 962.
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growing for ornament” on various pieces of land.64 The Court explained
that, even if the defendant did not regard the fir trees as ornamental, the
trees had been originally planted for that purpose.65 The Court concluded
that the injunction “by the terms” therefore prohibited the defendant’s
conduct.66
The U.S. Supreme Court has likewise applied textualism to interpret
injunctions. One of the most striking examples is United States v. Armour
& Co.67 That case involved a consent decree that prohibited Armour, a
meatpacking company, from distributing various food items.68 The decree
also barred Armour from owning any “capital stock or other interests
whatsoever” in any business that dealt in those food items.69
Greyhound Corp., a motor carrier that distributed the food items listed
in the decree, sought to acquire a controlling interest in Armour.70 The
Government opposed the acquisition, arguing that it would circumvent
the decree’s “purported purpose of separating the meatpackers from the
retail food business.”71
The Supreme Court concluded that the injunction did not prohibit the
acquisition.72 The Court acknowledged that the Government’s overall aim
in agreeing to the consent decree had been to achieve “structural
separation” between meatpackers and the transportation companies that
distributed food.73 But, the Court explained, the decree did not “effect a
complete separation” between meatpacking and distribution.74 Instead,
the decree prohibited only “particular actions and relationships not
including the one here in question.”75 The Court emphasized that, if the
parties had intended a different result, “they could have chosen language
64

Id. at 962. The injunction prohibited the defendant “from cutting down or felling any trees
or timber standing or growing for ornament . . . of the mansion-house and buildings at
Ombersley Court” and other nearby locations. Id.
65
Id. at 964.
66
Id. at 963–64. Woodward v. Earl Lincoln (1674) 36 Eng. Rep. 1000, provides another
example of textualism. There, an injunction quieted possession of property. The enjoined
individual later assisted a magistrate who lawfully seized the property for restitution. The court
held that this assistance violated the injunction. Id.
67
402 U.S. 673 (1971).
68
Id. at 676.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 674, 676.
71
Id. at 677.
72
Id. at 683.
73
Id. at 677.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 677–78.
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that would have established the sort of prohibition that the Government
now seeks.”76
In adopting this textualist approach, the Court rejected the
Government’s argument that allowing the acquisition would lead to the
same sort of anticompetitive behavior the decree sought to combat. The
Court stated that, although such enforcement considerations might have
justified the district court in entering a broader decree or even modifying
the existing decree, they had no bearing on its meaning.77
2. Purposivism
Purposivism directs judges to construe legal documents in the way that
will most effectively further the reasons for which they were issued.78 For
purposivists, the guiding consideration is the policy motivating a legal
provision.79 Under this theory, a court may apply a law more broadly than
its text suggests if doing so advances the law’s purpose.80 Likewise, a

76

Id. at 679.
Id. at 681; see also United States v. Atl. Ref. Co., 360 U.S. 19, 23–24 (1959) (interpreting
language in a consent decree based on its “normal meaning,” rather than adopting “another
reading” which “might seem more consistent with the Government’s reasons for entering into
the agreement in the first place”); Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353, 356–57 (1952)
(applying plain-meaning interpretation of consent decree). Justice Douglas’ dissent in Armour
employed a purposivist approach, instead. He declared that the “evil at which the decree is
aimed is combining meatpackers with companies in other food product areas.” Armour, 402
U.S. at 686 (Douglas, J., dissenting). That harm would occur, Justice Douglas said, regardless
of whether Armour itself sold prohibited food products, or a company that dealt in such
products acquired Armour instead. Id. at 687. Accordingly, he argued, despite the consent
decree’s narrow language, it should be given a broader construction to promote its underlying
goals more effectively.
78
See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 1374 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994) (1958) (concluding that courts should “[i]nterpret the words of the statute immediately
in question so as to carry out the purpose as best it can”); Max Radin, A Short Way with
Statutes, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 388, 407 (1942); see also Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739
(2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.) (“[S]tatutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish,
whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.”).
79
Manning, supra note 15, at 91 (“Purposivists give precedence to policy context.”
(emphasis omitted)).
80
See, e.g., Int’l Longshoreman’s & Warehouseman’s Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342
U.S. 237, 243 (1952) (applying a “looser, more liberal meaning” to the statutory term “district
court of the United States” in order to include Alaska’s territorial courts).
77
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court may apply a law more narrowly than its text if a broader reading
would not help achieve the law’s goals.81
Purposivist interpretations of injunctions also have a venerable
pedigree.82 In the 1795 decision Bolt v. Stanway, the English Court of
Exchequer relied on purposivism to expand the scope of an injunction.83
There, the injunction prohibited the defendant from suing the plaintiff for
money to satisfy a judgment that the defendant had obtained in an earlier
suit against the plaintiff. To avoid the injunction, the defendant sued a
sheriff who had already levied money from the plaintiff. The Court held
the defendant in contempt.84 Although the injunction’s text had prohibited
suits only against the plaintiff, the court reasoned that the suit against the
sheriff nevertheless violated the injunction. As Baron Hotham wrote, the
proceeding against the sheriff was “in sense and spirit[] a violation of the
injunction.”85
English courts also relied on purposivism to contract the scope of
injunctions. An example comes from the 1732 decision Morrice v.
Hankey.86 There, Hankey sued Morrice for damages. While that action
was pending, Morrice obtained an injunction that permitted Hankey to
continue his existing case but prohibited him from bringing any new
actions against Morrice. Hankey subsequently filed a writ of scire facias
for an accounting of Morrice’s assets.87 The court held that, although
filing the scire facias action contravened the injunction’s terms, it did not
81

See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“[A] thing
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers . . . .”).
82
See 1 Edward M. Dangel, Contempt § 242 (1939) (“[I]t is the spirit and not the letter of
the command to which obedience is required, and it must be obeyed in good faith according
to its spirit.”).
83
Bolt v. Stanway (1795) 145 Eng. Rep. 965, 965; 2 Anst. 556, 556–57.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 965; 2 Anst. at 557; accord Chaplin v. Cooper (1812) 35 Eng. Rep. 7, 8; 1 V. & B.
16, 19; see also Axe v. Clarke (1779) 21 Eng. Rep. 383, 383–84; Dickens 549, 549–50
(concluding that requiring the sheriff to tender seized assets to satisfy a judgment violated an
injunction prohibiting the plaintiff from recovering on that judgment); Robert Henley Eden,
A Treatise on the Law of Injunctions 72–73 (1821) (agreeing that, when a court enjoins a
person from suing to obtain someone else’s property, and the sheriff has attached that other
person’s property, the enjoined party may not sue the sheriff to obtain the attached property).
For another early example of purposivism, see St. John’s College, Oxford v. Carter (1839) 41
Eng. Rep. 191, 192; 4 My. & Cr. 497, 497–98 (holding that a defendant violated an injunction
prohibiting him from chopping wood in Bagley Wood by encouraging others to chop the
wood).
86
24 Eng. Rep. 1006; 3 P. Wms. 146.
87
Id. at 1006; 3 P. Wms. at 146–47.
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actually violate the injunction. The court explained that the scire facias
action was in form “a continuation only of the old [case] on the same
record,” since its aim was simply to identify the assets at issue in the
earlier matter.88
The U.S. Supreme Court has also relied on purposivism to broaden and
narrow the scope of injunctions. In the 1949 decision of McComb v.
Jacksonville Paper Co., for example, the Court used purposivism to
expand an injunction beyond its text.89 The injunction required employers
to pay various employees certain hourly rates, provide overtime pay to
people who worked more than 40 hours a week, and keep records on
employees’ work hours and pay.90 In response, the employers devised a
new system for compensating employees that did not take into account
the number of hours they worked.91 They also switched to awarding
bonuses to employees instead of raises, so the base salaries by which
employees’ overtime pay was determined would not increase.92
Additionally, the employers redesignated several employees as executive
or administrative personnel so they would be exempt from the overtime
requirements.93 Although these acts were clearly designed to circumvent
the injunction, the district court refused to hold the employers in contempt
because they had not violated any specific provisions of the decree.94
The Supreme Court reversed.95 It reasoned that subjecting parties to
contempt only if an injunction clearly and specifically prohibited their
conduct “would give tremendous impetus to [a] program of
experimentation with disobedience of the law.”96 The Court further
pointed out that, even if the district court had modified the injunction, the
employers could have altered their conduct again to circumvent the
restrictions.97

88

Id. at 1006; 3 P. Wms. at 148. Although relatively rare today, injunctions prohibiting
individuals from launching new legal proceedings were historically common. See Eden, supra
note 85, at 68. Courts regularly applied purposivism in interpreting those types of injunctions
to ensure that they did not unduly interfere with already pending actions. Id. at 69.
89
336 U.S. 187 (1949).
90
Id. at 189.
91
Id. at 190.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 195.
96
Id. at 192.
97
Id.
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The Court acknowledged that, under its purposivist approach, the scope
of the employers’ obligations under the injunction was uncertain. But it
reasoned that the employers “took a calculated risk” by attempting to
circumvent the order98 and should therefore face the consequences of
violating it.99 According to the Court, if the employers were unsure
whether their conduct was permissible, they should have asked the district
court for clarification.100
On the flip side of the coin, in Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago,
Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., the Court relied on purposivism
to narrow the scope of an injunction.101 Members of a milkmen’s union
had violently protested new retail dairy stores by smashing windows,
setting off firebombs and stink bombs, wrecking milk delivery trucks,
setting fires, assaulting store personnel and their suppliers, making
threats, and even shooting someone.102 This conduct resulted in an
injunction prohibiting union members from “interfering [with], hindering
or otherwise discouraging or diverting . . . persons desirous of or
contemplating purchasing milk and cream.”103 One of the injunction’s
specific prohibitions barred the use of “signs, banners or placards, and
walking up and down in front of said stores as aforesaid, and further
preventing the deliveries to said stores of other articles which said stores
sell through retail.”104
By its terms, the injunction was not limited to violent protests; it
prohibited picketing generally.105 But Justice Frankfurter, writing for the
majority, explained that the injunction “must be read in the context of its
98

Id. at 193.
Id.
100
Id. at 192. Justice Frankfurter—usually an avowed purposivist, see, e.g., Felix
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 538–39
(1947)—joined with Justice Jackson to issue a strong textualist dissent. He declared that
injunctions must be “explicit and precise.” McComb, 336 U.S. at 195 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). He believed that the injunction at issue lacked the “clearness of command”
required for a court to conclude that the defendants had disobeyed it. Id. at 196. “Behind the
vague inclusiveness of an injunction like the one before us,” Frankfurter cautioned, “is the
hazard of retrospective interpretation as the basis of punishment through contempt
proceedings.” Id. at 197. He further warned that holding respondents in contempt for violating
vague or general injunction provisions would encourage courts to draft orders with “indefinite
terms.” Id. “To be both strict and indefinite” was “a kind of judicial tyranny.” Id. at 195.
101
312 U.S. 287 (1941).
102
Id. at 291–92.
103
Id. at 308 (Black, J., dissenting).
104
Id.
105
Id.
99
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circumstances.”106 According to the Court, interpreting the injunction
more broadly to prohibit all picketing would “distort[] the meaning of
things” by ignoring the violence that gave rise to it.107
3. Intentionalism
Intentionalism requires courts to interpret legal documents based on
what the drafter subjectively intended the text to mean.108 Unlike
purposivism, intentionalism does not ask how to best serve the policy
objectives that led to a legal provision’s adoption, but rather how the
drafter herself would interpret the document.109
In Ex Parte Hobbs, the Supreme Court relied on intentionalism to
construe an injunction to determine whether the district judge had
jurisdiction to enter it.110 Under federal law at the time, only a three-judge
district court could enter a preliminary injunction against the enforcement
of state laws on constitutional grounds.111 A single judge sitting alone,
however, could enjoin state laws for any other, non-constitutional
reasons. In Hobbs, several fire insurance companies sued in federal court,
alleging that it was unconstitutional for the Kansas insurance
commissioner to revoke their licenses.112 At the start of the suit, however,
the companies moved for a preliminary injunction on different, nonconstitutional grounds, contending that the commissioner lacked
106

Id. at 298 (majority opinion).
Id. Justice Black, applying a primarily textualist approach, dissented, refusing to read
such implicit limitations into the injunction. Rejecting Frankfurter’s interpretation, Black
stated, “I find not even slight justification for an interpretation of this injunction so as to
confine its prohibitions to conduct near stores dealing in respondent’s milk. Neither the
language of the injunction nor that of the complaint which sought the injunction indicates such
a limitation.” Id. at 310 (Black, J., dissenting). Black’s proposed methodology departed from
textualism, however, because he argued that to interpret the injunction, the Court must
consider not only the injunction itself, but also “the complaint, the answer, the evidence, the
findings, and the decision and judgment of the Illinois courts.” Id. at 307.
108
See, e.g., United States v. Klinger, 199 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1952) (Hand, J.) (“[W]hat
we do, and must do, is to project ourselves, as best we can, into the position of those who
uttered the words, and to impute to them how they would have dealt with the concrete
occasion.”), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 345 U.S. 979 (1953) (per curiam).
109
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50
U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 817 (1983) (“The judge should try to think his way as best he can into
the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the statute
applied to the case at bar.”).
110
280 U.S. 168 (1929).
111
28 U.S.C. § 380 (1925) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2018)); Michael T. Morley,
Vertical Stare Decisis and Three-Judge District Courts, 108 Geo. L.J. 699, 727–33 (2020).
112
Hobbs, 280 U.S. at 170.
107
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authority under state law to revoke their licenses.113 The single judge
hearing the case granted the preliminary injunction.114
The Supreme Court upheld the injunction. It rejected the argument that
the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the injunction because the
judge had actually issued the injunction on the ground that the license
revocation was unconstitutional. The Court explained that the “[j]udge
knows at least what he intended and supposed himself to do.”115 And the
district judge had stated that the “only question before him was the
construction” of the state law.116 Thus, the district court’s apparent
intentions controlled the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the injunction.
4. Pragmatism
A pragmatic approach urges courts to interpret legal documents so as
to reach the “best” outcome.117 This theory counsels judges to consider
the costs and benefits of various interpretations, as well as the extent to
which they align with social values.118 Pragmatists contend that, because
most legal texts are indeterminate, courts should simply select the
construction that achieves the greatest social benefit.119
One possible example of a court employing pragmatism in interpreting
an injunction comes from Schering Corp. v. Illinois Antibiotics Co.120
There, a consent decree forbade a company from selling an antibiotic
reagent in a liquid “solution” form.121 The company subsequently sold the

113

Id. at 171.
Id.
115
Id. at 172.
116
Id.
117
See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 95 (1986) (explaining that pragmatism counsels
courts to “make whatever decisions seem to them best for the community’s future, not
counting any form of consistency with the past as valuable for its own sake”); Richard A.
Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy 59–60 (2003) (arguing for legal interpretations that
produce the best outcomes); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 Duke L.J. 909, 992
(2016) (explaining that pragmatism “posits only that judges should construe statutes by
focusing on the practical consequences that will result from an interpretation and seeking the
best result”).
118
Krishnakumar, supra note 117, at 993 (noting that pragmatists argue that interpretation
should take into account both social context and more tangible consequences).
119
Id. (noting that pragmatists argue that “the goal of statutory interpretation should be to
produce the best results for society”) (citing Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral &
Legal Theory 227 (1999); Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 73–74 (1990)).
120
62 F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.).
121
Id. at 905.
114
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reagent in a powdered form, which could easily be dissolved in water.122
Although the sale of powder did not violate the literal terms of the
injunction, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the injunction should be
interpreted to prohibit it.123 The court explained that a broad reading was
necessary to prevent the company from circumventing the consent decree
and thwarting the parties’ expectations in entering into it.124 It also noted
that the broad interpretation would avoid inundating the courts with
requests to modify injunctions.125
II. USING TEXTUALISM TO INTERPRET INJUNCTIONS
The jumble of different methods for interpreting injunctions creates a
serious risk of uncertainty. Accordingly, we propose that courts apply
modified textualism to construe injunctions. Under this approach, courts
would generally interpret injunctions according to their ordinary
meaning. The basic inquiry would be how a reasonable person would
understand the text as it is written.126 A person may be held in contempt
for violating an injunction only if her conduct violates its language, read
in context.127
We call this approach “modified” textualism because there is one
circumstance in which courts should depart from a pure textualist
interpretation. When a provision in an injunction quotes or incorporates
by reference an extrinsic legal authority, such as a statute or contractual
provision, the court should interpret that provision of the injunction by
using whatever methodology it would otherwise apply to that extrinsic
authority.128 For example, if a court employs purposivism to interpret
statutes, it should employ purposivism to interpret a provision in an
injunction quoting a statute. This Part provides practical, theoretical, and
doctrinal reasons why courts should use this modified version of
textualism to interpret injunctions, then addresses potential objections. In
122

Id.
Id. at 907.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 906.
126
Manning, supra note 15, at 76 (explaining that textualism counsels a court to interpret
legal writings based on how “a reasonable person would use language under the
circumstances”).
127
Although a court should generally employ textualism to determine the meaning of
injunctions, we also propose that a court consider an injunction’s purpose when determining
whether to impose sanctions on a violator. See infra Section III.C.
128
See infra Section III.A.
123
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making this argument, we focus on permanent injunctions. We expand
the argument to other types of injunctions in Part III.
A. Supporting a Textualist Approach to Interpreting Injunctions
Most arguments about interpretive methodology focus on statutory
interpretation. But many of the primary arguments for textualism as a
theory of statutory interpretation are inapplicable to injunctions. For
example, a main justification for textualism is that it allows courts to most
faithfully implement the will of the legislature.129 Textualists emphasize
that statutes do not embody a single purpose or intent. Legislatures are
multimember bodies. They consist of officials elected by different
constituencies seeking to protect or promote different interests.130 These
legislators rarely, if ever, share a single collective intent.131 A statute is
the product of compromise among these legislators, and the statutory text
embodies that compromise.132 Adhering to the text is therefore the best
way of faithfully implementing the bargains that the legislators struck.
A second frequent argument for textualism is that the federal and state
constitutions demand a textualist approach to statutory interpretation.
These constitutions establish procedures such as bicameralism and
presentment for the enactment of legislation,133 and only the text of the
law has gone through these constitutional processes.134
129

Manning, Equity, supra note 13, at 7 (arguing that textualism more faithfully implements
legislative will than purposivism).
130
See Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal
Federalism, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 57, 87 (2014) (explaining how political minorities may use
vetogates to block legislation).
131
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 547 (1983) (“Although
legislators have individual lists of desires, priorities, and preferences, it turns out to be
difficult, sometimes impossible, to aggregate these lists into a coherent collective choice.”).
132
See id. at 546.
133
U.S. Const. art. I, § 7. All states have a presentment requirement, see Jordan E. Pratt,
Disregard of Unconstitutional Laws in the Plural State Executive, 86 Miss. L.J. 881, 910
(2017) (“Like the federal Constitution, all state constitutions require that, to become law, bills
must either be passed by the legislature and approved by the governor, or enacted by the
legislature over the governor’s veto.”), and forty-nine have bicameralism requirements, see
Hillel Y. Levin, Stacie Patrice Kershner, Timothy D. Lytton, Daniel Salmon & Saad B. Omer,
Stopping the Resurgence of Vaccine-Preventable Childhood Diseases: Policy, Politics, and
Law, 2020 U. Ill. L. Rev. 233, 252 (discussing the “forty-nine states with bicameral
legislatures”).
134
Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1610, 1612 (2012) (“Nothing but the text has received
the approval of the majority of the legislature and of the President, assuming that he signed it
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These arguments do not directly translate to injunctions, however. A
court construing an injunction is not acting as some other entity’s faithful
agent. An injunction is an order of the court, and courts typically enforce
their own injunctions.135 As a practical matter, the judge who interprets
an injunction is ordinarily the one who entered it.136 And because
injunctions are usually entered by a single judge, they are not ordinarily
the result of compromises among multiple people—even though opposing
litigants may recommend language for the court to use. Nor do
constitutions or other legal authorities prescribe processes, beyond a
district judge’s signature, through which an injunction’s text must be
approved.
Several other important considerations, however, strongly support
textualism as the primary theory for interpreting injunctions. These
factors include ensuring adequate notice of proscribed conduct,
preventing arbitrary and vindictive judicial action, and ensuring
consistency with procedural rules.
1. Notice
Textualism most effectively promotes the related goals of ensuring that
individuals have adequate notice of the conduct that an injunction
proscribes or requires, and that they are not unexpectedly punished for
conduct an injunction could be read to permit.137 A basic premise of our
legal system is that a person should not be held accountable for violating
the law unless she had reasonable notice of what the law required at the
time of her actions.138 People must have a fair opportunity to conform
their behavior to the law’s requirements.139 Notice is an essential

rather than vetoed it and had it passed over his veto. Nothing but the text reflects the full
legislature’s purpose.”).
135
Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 236 (1998) (“Sanctions for violations of an
injunction, in any event, are generally administered by the court that issued the injunction.”).
136
See Seidenberg, supra note 12, at 16 (“[A] contempt proceeding is usually heard by the
same judge who issued the injunction . . . .”).
137
Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 542, 557 (2009) [hereinafter Fair
Notice] (“[T]extualism by its very definition seeks to satisfy this dictate of fair notice . . . .”).
138
See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 & n.8 (1974) (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)).
139
Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Procedural Rights at Sentencing, 90 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 187, 210 (2014).
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component of due process,140 and it undergirds the Constitution’s
prohibitions on ex post facto laws.141
The law has long enforced these notice principles in the context of
injunctions.142 More than two hundred years ago, English courts explicitly
recognized that a person cannot be held in contempt for violating an
injunction that did not provide adequate notice of the prohibited acts.143
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently embraced this notice principle
as well, holding more than a century ago that, because “contempt is a
severe remedy,” courts should not resort to it “where there is fair ground
of doubt as to the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct.”144 The Court
has repeatedly reaffirmed this doctrine in the decades since, most recently
in 2019.145
The requirement for adequate notice in injunctions is a close cousin of
the rule of lenity, which directs courts to interpret criminal statutes
“strictly.”146 Under the rule, courts must resolve ambiguous criminal
statutes in the defendant’s favor.147 It rests in large part on the idea that
people should not be punished for their actions unless they had clear
notice that those actions are illegal.148 Although the rule of lenity governs
140
See United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2325 (2019) (“Vague laws contravene the
‘first essential of due process of law’ that statutes must give people ‘of common intelligence’
fair notice of what the law demands of them.” (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391 (1926))).
141
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting Congress from enacting ex post facto laws); id.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting states from enacting ex post facto laws); see Bouie v. City of
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353–54 (1964).
142
Charles Stewart Drewry, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Injunctions 398 (1842)
(“To be guilty of a breach of injunction, the party must have notice of it . . . .”).
143
See, e.g., Marquis of Downshire v. Lady Sandys (1801) 31 Eng. Rep. 962, 963; 6 Ves.
Jun. 108, 109 (observing the duty of the courts to define an injunction’s terms “with precision
and accuracy” so that it “might be clearly understood by the parties”); Skip v. Harwood (1747)
26 Eng. Rep. 1125, 1125; 3 Atk. 564, 565 (discussing the importance of notice in an
injunction).
144
Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609, 618 (1885).
145
Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1802 (2019) (“‘[B]asic fairness requir[es] that
those enjoined receive explicit notice’ of ‘what conduct is outlawed’ before being held in civil
contempt . . . .” (quoting Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974) (per curiam))).
146
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820); see 1 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *88 (“Penal statutes must be construed strictly.”).
147
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2333 (2019).
148
See id. (observing that the rule of lenity “is founded on ‘the tenderness of the law for the
rights of individuals’ to fair notice of the law” (quoting Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 95));
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (explaining that the rule of lenity arises in
part from “the instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has
clearly said they should” (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading
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criminal statutes, it also applies when a court construes a criminal statute
that is being enforced civilly.149 A statute has a single, consistent meaning
that courts must apply regardless of the remedy being sought in a
particular case.150
The rationale underlying the rule of lenity applies equally to
injunctions.151 Injunctions may be enforced through either civil or
criminal contempt.152 Criminal contempt is a criminal proceeding that
subjects violators to most of the same types of punishments as criminal
statutes.153 This threat of punishment triggers the same concerns that
motivate the rule of lenity.
The rule of lenity should also apply when an injunction is enforced in
civil proceedings. An injunction is a legal document with a particular
meaning which should not change depending on the mechanism used to
enforce it.154 Moreover, although coercive contempt is not intended to
punish, the mechanisms it uses to coerce compliance mirror
punishment.155 A court may impose fines, imprisonment, and other
obligations to compel compliance with an injunction.
of Statutes, in Benchmarks 196, 209 (1967))); see also United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507,
514 (2008) (plurality opinion) (stating that the rule of lenity “vindicates the fundamental
principle that no citizen should be held accountable for a violation of a statute whose
commands are uncertain, or subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed”).
149
See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (“Because we must interpret the statute
consistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal context, the
rule of lenity applies.”); United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517–18
(1992) (plurality opinion) (applying the rule of lenity to a “tax statute . . . in a civil setting”
because the statute “has criminal applications”).
150
See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–81 (2005) (holding that, if a court must
construe a statute’s language a particular way in one setting, that interpretation carries over to
other settings, and declaring that “[t]he lowest common denominator, as it were, must
govern”).
151
Although the rule of lenity is a doctrine of statutory interpretation, a handful of courts
have applied it when interpreting injunctions to decide whether to impose criminal contempt.
See, e.g., Gates v. Pfeiffer, No. G039450, 2009 WL 693468, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 17,
2009) (citing Lopez v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 929, 935 (Ct. App. 2008)) (“As a penal
law, the restraining order was subject to the so-called ‘rule of lenity,’ which requires that
ambiguities in penal laws be construed in favor of defendants.”).
152
See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
153
See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
154
Cf. Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11 n.8 (explaining that “[b]ecause we must interpret the statute
consistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal context, the
rule of lenity applies”).
155
Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801–02 (2019) (justifying the rule of strict
construction in a compensatory contempt case on the ground that coercive contempt can be a
severe remedy); see also Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369 (1966) (stating that
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Textualism ensures, better than alternative theories, that defendants
have notice about the range of conduct that an injunction mandates or
prohibits.156 It requires the court to determine how an ordinary person
would understand the scope of the injunction from reading it.157 This
approach protects people from having to speculate about the motivation
or intent behind an injunction and how those considerations might affect
its interpretation.
Other methods of interpretation provide less notice. With purposivism,
for example, the reach of an injunction depends on the policies underlying
it.158 Individuals subject to the injunction might not know those policies,
or how far a court might choose to enforce them.159 Compounding the
problem is the fact that injunctions seldom seek to implement a single
purpose. Instead, as with statutes, they are usually the product of multiple
competing policies and values. One cannot always guess ex ante how a
judge might balance those competing policies before engaging in conduct
that possibly comes within the valence of the injunction.
Intentionalism raises similar concerns. Individuals can only guess at
their precise obligations under an intentionalist approach, because they
cannot infer exactly how a judge subjectively intended the injunction to
apply in all situations. Intentionalism leaves people to speculate about
how the judge would have wanted the injunction to apply to various sets
of circumstances.160
The same problems arise for pragmatism. A pragmatic interpretation
turns on how a judge views the relative costs and benefits of different

civil contempt constitutes “punishment,” but that it has a different “character and purpose”
than criminal contempt (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441
(1911))).
156
See Fair Notice, supra note 137, at 557 (“Textualism as fair notice emphasizes the
importance of interpreting laws as their subjects would fairly have expected them to apply.”).
157
See Manning, supra note 15, at 76 (explaining that textualism counsels a court to interpret
legal writings based on how “a reasonable person would use language under the
circumstances”).
158
See Hart & Sacks, supra note 78, at 1374 (concluding that courts should “[i]nterpret the
words of the statute immediately in question so as to carry out the purpose as best it can”).
159
See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 59, 63 (1988) (“[L]aw is like a vector. It has length as well as direction.
We must find both, or we know nothing of value. To find length we must take account of
objectives, of means chosen, and of stopping places identified.”).
160
See Posner, supra note 109, at 817 (explaining that, under an intentionalist approach,
“the task for the judge . . . [is] to think his way as best he can into the minds of the enacting
legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar”).
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possible interpretations at the time she interprets the injunction.161 No one
can reliably predict ex ante all the considerations that will inform the
judge’s thinking, much less how the judge will weigh those
considerations in fashioning an interpretation.162
This is not to say that textualism avoids all uncertainty. Sometimes
people can disagree about the ordinary meaning of a document’s text. For
example, suppose a court enters an injunction that “prohibits the use of a
gun in connection with a protest.” Does trading a gun for a sign to use at
the protest violate the injunction? For many textualists, the answer would
be no, on the grounds that the ordinary meaning163 of the phrase “use of a
gun” is to shoot it, instead of employing the gun for some other purpose—
for example as an object to trade, a crutch, or artwork.164 But others might
conclude that the word “use” has a broader reach.165
But other interpretive approaches would generate uncertainties of their
own. They require parties to speculate about a judge’s motivations when
entering an injunction or how a judge will weigh various competing
policies in interpreting it. Textualism avoids these other types of
uncertainty. By focusing the analysis on the ordinary meaning of
language, textualism allows the meaning of injunctions to turn on
considerations more accessible to enjoined parties than the judge’s
personal beliefs, preferences, and expectations.
2. Preventing Arbitrary Exercises of Power
Another fundamental aim of our legal system is to prevent the
government from exercising its power arbitrarily and wrongfully against
individuals.166 One of the principal structural protections aimed at
preventing the government from acting in this way is separation of
161
Krishnakumar, supra note 117, at 993 (noting that pragmatists argue that interpretation
should consider social context and practical consequences).
162
Id. at 915 (noting that pragmatism “does not claim to promote predictability”).
163
See Manning, Textualism, supra note 13, at 434 (stating that “modern textualists” look
to the “ordinary meaning” of words and phrases, as well as “the relevant linguistic
community’s (or sub-community’s) shared understandings and practices”).
164
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]o speak of
‘using a firearm’ is to speak of using it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a weapon. To be sure,
‘one can use a firearm in a number of ways,’ . . . including as an article of exchange, . . . but
that is not the ordinary meaning of ‘using’ [it].” (footnote omitted)).
165
The rule of lenity would point toward the narrower definition of use, of course.
166
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,
125 (1990)) (noting that protection from “arbitrary, wrongful government actions” is a core
feature of due process).
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powers.167 No single government actor typically has the power to define
the law, enforce it, and determine whether the law was violated. Rather,
those powers are divided among Congress, the executive, and the courts.
This dispersion of authority prevents individual government actors from
vindictively or wrongfully depriving individuals of liberty and
property.168
But these separation of power protections do not apply to
injunctions.169 The court plays both the legislative role of crafting the
injunction and the judicial role of interpreting it; often, the same judge
both enters and enforces the injunction.170 Combining these roles creates
the risk of “arbitrary control.”171 Moreover, common sense dictates that a
person who writes a law is more likely to apply it in a way that he or she
desires instead of according to its terms. It may be difficult for the judge
who drafted an injunction to distinguish between the objective plain
meaning of a text, what he or she subjectively intended that text to mean,
and the personal desire to ensure the order is not circumvented. To make
matters worse, the judge who enters an injunction may treat an alleged
167

The Federalist No. 47, at 316 (James Madison) (Harvard Univ. Press ed. 2009) (praising
separation of powers on the ground that “accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny”);
see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (“[W]e have not yet found a better way to
preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted
restraints spelled out in the Constitution.”).
168
See The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and
Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1513, 1534 (1991) (“[S]eparation of powers [is] aimed at
the interconnected goals of preventing tyranny and protecting liberty.”); see also Ilan Wurman,
Constitutional Administration, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 359, 368–69 (2017).
169
Of course, injunctions predate modern conceptions of separation of powers. But the
primary reason the Framers adopted separation of powers as a critical structural principle for
the Constitution was to provide increased protection for individual liberty compared to the
traditional English system. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution:
Executive Power and the War on Terrorism, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 16–17 (2006) (“Having
endured the tyranny of the King of England, the framers viewed the principle of separation of
powers as the central guarantee of a just government.”).
170
Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 840, (1994) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (“That one and the same person should be able to make the rule, to adjudicate
its violation, and to assess its penalty is out of accord with our usual notions of fairness and
separation of powers.”).
171
Charles de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 174 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1873)
(1748) (stating that, if those functions are united, “the life and liberty of the subject would be
exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator” (emphasis added));
accord The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison); see also Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of
Judicial Independence, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 671, 701 (1980) (arguing that separating the
judiciary from the legislature is central to ensuring “impartial justice”).
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violation of it as a personal affront to the judge’s authority. Injunctions,
therefore, present an acute risk of abuse of power.
Employing textualism to interpret injunctions in contempt proceedings
reduces these risks. Under a textualist approach, a judge may hold a
person in contempt only when that person’s actions violate the ordinary
understanding of the injunction’s language. Textualism makes it more
difficult for judges to impose contempt based solely on their belief that a
defendant’s conduct should be punished.
Textualism’s protections are especially appropriate since injunctions
are aimed against particular litigants. Ordinarily, legislation affects large
classes of people or the general public. Courts may shun aggressive
interpretations of the law against certain disfavored parties because the
same interpretation would typically extend to others, as well. These
protections do not extend to injunctions. Textualism provides an
alternative mechanism to ensure that courts treat enjoined parties fairly.
Courts must also be careful to avoid unfairly overbroad interpretations
of injunctions against government agencies. Such structural injunctions
raise the possibility of judicial interference with policy decisions and
discretion entrusted to executive and administrative officials.172
Textualism constrains this power, at least to some degree. It prevents the
court from expanding an injunction’s scope through the process of
interpretation, thereby enabling the court to control—whether
intentionally or unwittingly—a wider range of agency decisions and
actions.
3. Consistency with Rule 65 and State Counterparts
A textualist approach is also most consistent with the state and federal
rules prescribing the requirements for drafting injunctions. Recall that
Rule 65, for example, provides that an injunction must “state its terms
specifically” and “describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts
restrained or required.”173 Forty-nine states have similar requirements.174
Rule 65(d)’s specificity and detail requirements suggest that a person
may not be held in contempt for violating restrictions that do not appear

172

Doug Rendleman, Preserving the Nationwide National Government Injunction to Stop
Illegal Executive Branch Activity, 91 U. Colo. L. Rev. 887, 931 (2020) (“The structural
injunction has faced criticism on two major grounds: federalism and separation of powers.”).
173
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(B)–(C).
174
See supra note 34.
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on the face of the injunction itself.175 These requirements promote the
same objectives as textualism: ensuring notice and constraining the
courts.176 Rule 65 and its state-law analogues would be toothless if courts
could expand injunctions beyond their text to cover additional acts.
The Supreme Court has consistently refused to enforce injunctions that
are too vague or ambiguous to satisfy Rule 65.177 These precedents
suggest that a court may not satisfy the Rule’s requirements by
supplementing an injunction’s text with details concerning the district
judge’s intentions about the injunction’s meaning or the purposes
underlying it.178
B. Objections
Despite the benefits of textualism, competing considerations might
appear to counsel in favor of other methodologies. For example, one
might object that textualism allows parties to circumvent injunctions too
easily. An enjoined person could simply engage in conduct that is similar
to that forbidden by the injunction but falls outside the injunction’s text.

175
Wright et al., supra note 35, § 2955 (explaining that, since Rule 65(d)’s language
“strongly suggests that only those acts specified by the order will be treated as within its scope
and that no conduct or action will be prohibited by implication, all omissions or ambiguities
in the order will be resolved in favor of any person charged with contempt”).
176
See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Ill. Antibiotics Co., 62 F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 1995); see
also supra notes 120–25 (discussing Schering).
177
See Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974) (declining to enforce an injunction on
the grounds it violated Rule 65(d), because the order was neither “‘specific’ in outlining the
‘terms’ of the injunctive relief granted,” nor “describe[d] ‘in reasonable detail . . . the act or
acts sought to be restrained’”); see also Int’l Longshoreman’s Ass’n v. Phila. Marine Trade
Ass’n, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967) (overturning “unintelligible” injunction); Hartford-Empire Co.
v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 410 (1945); see also Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1317
(1981) (Rehnquist, C.J., in chambers) (staying order requiring prison officials to reduce prison
population by “at least 250” by a particular date because it “falls short of this specificity
requirement”).
178
In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 512 U.S. 753, 808–09 (1994), Justice Scalia
suggested in his concurrence that the injunction at issue should be read narrowly to satisfy the
precision requirement. But in doing so, Justice Scalia did not suggest that a judge’s intent
could be used to cure an otherwise defective injunction. Instead, he effectively used the
precision requirement as the basis for a substantive canon of interpretation, analogous to the
constitutional avoidance principle. Cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490,
507 (1979) (declining to interpret a federal law in a way that would raise “difficult and
sensitive questions” under the First Amendment). Under Justice Scalia’s approach, courts
should reject a broad interpretation of an injunction that would cause that injunction to violate
Rule 65(d)’s “axiomatic requirement that its terms be drawn with precision.” Madsen, 512
U.S. at 809.
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Other methodologies, in contrast, more readily prevent circumvention
because they allow a judge to extend an injunction beyond its text.
Conversely, one might contend that a textualist approach encourages
courts to draft injunctions too broadly, so as to encompass any potentially
harmful act in which a defendant may engage.
Another argument against textualism is more philosophical. One might
object that the true content of an injunction is determined by the intentions
of the judge who enters the order, rather than its text. Under this view,
just as courts often say that the goal of statutory interpretation is to
determine the legislature’s intent,179 one might conclude that the proper
way to interpret an injunction is by gleaning the entering court’s intent.
Neither argument, however, provides a sound basis for adopting a
methodology other than textualism.
1. Achieving the Purpose of an Injunction
Courts typically enter injunctions to prevent one entity from violating
either another party’s rights or some other legal restriction.180 A textualist
approach to interpreting injunctions might appear ill-equipped to achieve
this goal. Textualism requires a judge to interpret an injunction according
to its text, rather than expanding its scope to achieve its purpose of
preventing violations of rights or other underlying legal provisions.
Consequently, parties can often circumvent an injunction by engaging in
conduct that is similar or related to the acts forbidden by an injunction,
but that falls outside the order’s terms. For example, under a textualist
approach, a party could circumvent an injunction forbidding the ringing
of a bell by playing a recording of that bell.
Non-textualist methods of interpretation largely avoid this problem.
Purposivism allows judges to depart from an injunction’s text when
necessary to achieve its purposes.181 Intentionalism ensures that an
injunction sweeps as broadly as the judge intended, regardless of whether

179

See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986) (“[O]ur role is to interpret the intent
of Congress in enacting [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 . . . .”).
180
See, e.g., United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) (“The purpose of
an injunction is to prevent future violations” of the underlying legal provisions.); cf. Cont’l
Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Rye Co., 294 U.S. 648, 676 (1935)
(noting that an injunction may be issued “for the purpose of protecting and preserving the
jurisdiction of the court ‘until the object of the suit is accomplished and complete justice done
between the parties’” (quoting Looney v. E. Tex. R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 214, 221 (1918))).
181
See supra note 77.
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its text actually embodies that intent.182And pragmatism would permit
judges to interpret injunctions to achieve the best policy outcomes,
regardless of the orders’ textual limitations.
It is true that textualism prohibits courts from holding a person in
contempt for acts that violate the spirit of an injunction. But this is a
feature of textualism, not a bug. The ability to impose contempt sanctions
for violating an injunction’s spirit creates the problems concerning
inadequate notice and potential for judicial abuse that textualism seeks to
avoid. Moreover, textualist courts can prevent this type of circumvention
by modifying injunctions to close loopholes. A court may modify its
injunctions either sua sponte or at a party’s request.183 Modification is
appropriate where subsequent developments demonstrate that the
injunction is not effectively achieving its purposes or a party is
circumventing its restrictions.184 Thus, a court does not need to stretch an
injunction’s language to prevent circumvention.185
2. The Risk of Overly Broad Injunctions
A second objection is that textualism might lead courts to issue overly
broad injunctions. Under a textualist approach, a court cannot interpret an
injunction beyond its terms to encompass conduct that the court meant to
forbid. These constraints may lead a court to use broad terms or a lengthy
list of terms with similar and overlapping meanings to maximize the
likelihood that the injunction actually covers the conduct that the court
wished to prohibit. Such sweeping language may unnecessarily enjoin
“too much” conduct.

182

See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 632 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner,
J.) (describing an injunction as “appallingly bad” and ordering its modification sua sponte);
W. Water Mgmt., Inc. v. Brown, 40 F.3d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1994) (recognizing a district
court’s authority to modify injunctions sua sponte with prior notice to the parties). See
generally Wright et al., supra note 35, § 2961 (noting the “universally recognized principle
that a court has continuing power to modify or vacate” an injunction).
184
See Jost, supra note 11, at 1109 (explaining how courts can use their power to modify
injunctions to address unexpected changes in circumstance); see, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v.
United States, 316 U.S. 556, 560 (1942) (modifying injunction in light of the parties’ actions).
185
See United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681–82 (1971) (refusing to interpret
a consent decree beyond its “four corners,” and declaring that the Government should instead
ask the trial court to modify the decree if it is not achieving its intended purposes). Requiring
a textualist approach would also incentivize judges to craft injunctions more precisely, to
accurately embody their intended proscriptions and promote their goals.
183
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While textualism may give courts an incentive to issue broader
injunctions, such detail can help ensure adequate notice to enjoined
parties. Moreover, other doctrines limit courts’ ability to issue overly
broad injunctions. Traditional equitable principles require injunctions to
be tailored to preventing violations of the underlying legal restrictions.186
Even prophylactic injunctions must be tailored with that goal in mind.187
A court generally may not go substantially beyond enjoining the harm at
issue in a lawsuit to prohibit unrelated conduct, as well. Within the scope
of those constraints, however, it seems desirable for an injunction to be as
clear and specific as possible to minimize the potential for interpretive
disputes.
3. The Nature of an Injunction
A different argument against the use of textualism to interpret
injunctions focuses on the nature of injunctions. One might say that an
injunction “actually” consists of what the entering judge intended, rather
than what the order’s written terms state. Under this approach, the text of
the injunction is simply evidence of what the injunction requires. From
this perspective, intentionalism or purposivism would be better suited
than textualism to interpret injunctions.
This argument, however, seems to be based on an incorrect view of
injunctions. No one would contend that a litigant is bound by a judge’s
subjective, unexpressed intentions, unless and until the court enters an
injunction. Since the entry of the order is necessary to impose legal
obligations on a party, it is unclear why the court’s subjective,
unexpressed intentions would gain any greater legal effect at that point. It
is the written order itself, rather than the judge’s intentions, that creates
legal obligations. No new legal duties arise independent of the order.
A separate, but related, argument in favor of intentionalism is that,
when courts construe legal texts, they act as agents of the drafters, and
performing that role faithfully requires them to carry out the drafters’
desires.188 When a court enforces a statute, for example, it is acting as the
agent of the legislature, and therefore should carry out the legislature’s
186

See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
See id.
188
This argument does not go to the nature of an injunction. Instead, it is an argument about
the court’s role in interpreting injunctions. In other words, the argument does not claim that
an injunction is the intent of the drafter; rather, it claims that, to perform their role as agent
honestly, courts should seek to implement the drafter’s intent.
187
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wishes.189 Building on this argument, some contend that courts should
consider the text of a statute only because it is the best evidence of
legislative intent.190
This faithful agent theory does not establish that courts should use
intentionalism. All major theories of interpretation operate on the premise
that courts should act as faithful agents when interpreting the words of
others.191 The question is which theory is best at achieving that goal.
Textualists argue that textualism is better than the alternatives at
implementing the court’s role of being a faithful agent.192 Because of
difficulties in ascertaining a drafter’s actual intent at the time of drafting,
focusing on the text is the best way to effectuate the policies of the
drafter.193
III. REFINING THE SCOPE OF THE PROPOSAL
So far, the discussion has focused on explaining why textualism is
generally the best method for interpreting injunctions. But some
important refinements are in order. This Part begins by explaining why
courts should apply “modified” textualism when interpreting injunctions.
Specifically, it explains that, when a provision within an injunction quotes
or incorporates by reference an extrinsic legal authority, the court should
construe that provision according to the interpretive approach it would
ordinarily apply to authorities of that nature. This Part then goes on to
contend that courts should apply this modified textualist approach to all
189

See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 109,
112 (2010) (discussing the faithful agent theory of interpretation).
190
Anita S. Krishnakumar, Backdoor Purposivism, 69 Duke L.J. 1275, 1284–85 (2020).
191
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories
of Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment Within Both,
99 Cornell L. Rev. 685, 686 (2014) (“A central ambition of most theories of statutory
interpretation is to ensure that judges act as faithful agents of the legislature . . . .”); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Judges as Honest Agents, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 915, 915 (2010) (“The
honest-agent [theory] is not controversial.”).
192
Manning, Equity, supra note 13, at 16 & n.65 (“[A] faithful agent’s job is to decode
legislative instructions according to the common social and linguistic conventions shared by
the relevant community.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 61, 63 (1994); see also Fallon, supra note 191, at
687 (“In textualists’ estimation, courts best act as faithful agents by enforcing the fair meaning
of the words that the legislature enacted.”).
193
See Easterbrook, supra note 191, at 922 (describing difficulties in identifying the desires
of drafters); Krishnakumar, supra note 190, at 1334–35 (“[M]any textualists take the view that
the enacted text is the best available evidence of Congress’s intent and that close attention to
the text is the only way to accurately effectuate that intent.”).
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types of injunctions, including permanent injunctions, preliminary
injunctions, TROs, and consent decrees. It concludes by establishing that,
while modified textualism is the proper way to determine an injunction’s
meaning, a court may still consider whether the defendant’s conduct
contravened the injunction’s purpose or undermined its goals in deciding
whether to hold the defendant in contempt.
A. Extrinsic Legal Authorities
Injunctions often quote, paraphrase, or incorporate by reference other
legal sources such as constitutional clauses, statutes, regulations, and
contracts.194 Different considerations apply to interpreting each type of
legal document.195 As a result, courts often use—and many commentators
advocate—a variety of theories when interpreting such authorities. A
judge who thinks that textualism should control the interpretation of
injunctions might conclude, for example, that purposivism is the
appropriate method for interpreting statutes.
This divergence presents a conundrum. Applying textualism to
interpret extrinsic legal sources when they are quoted in an injunction,
while also applying a different method when interpreting those same
sources directly, could lead to inconsistency and incoherence. The
interpretation of a legal authority, such as a statute, could change
depending on whether it occurred in a contempt proceeding or a different
setting.
Inconsistencies could even arise within the same case when a court
issues an injunction to enforce a particular legal provision. For example,
assume that one section within an injunction quotes a statute. If a court
applies textualism to that part of the injunction, it might construe the
incorporated statutory language more narrowly than it would interpret the
same language in the statute itself, resulting in underenforcement.
Conversely, applying conflicting methodologies could also lead a court
to interpret a legal provision more broadly when it appears in an
injunction than when the court directly interprets that provision itself.
194

See, e.g., In re W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. 34, 95–96 (D. Del. 2012) (discussing
injunction incorporating statutes relating to asbestos claims); In re S.N., No. E055823, 2014
WL 185651, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2014) (discussing injunction incorporating statutes
relating to gang violence).
195
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications
for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1235, 1237 (2015) (explaining how
different theories are appropriate for interpreting various types of texts).
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Such interpretive inconsistency would subject the defendant to greater
restrictions under the injunction than the underlying provision itself
actually imposes.
For example, suppose the Smith Act provides, “No vehicles are
permitted in the park.”196 Paul seeks an injunction prohibiting Dan from
bringing a motorcycle into the park. The court thinks that the text of the
Act applies to all vehicles, but the Act’s purpose was to prohibit only
motor vehicles. Applying purposivism as its preferred approach to
statutory interpretation, the court concludes that Paul is entitled to an
injunction, because prohibiting a motorcycle falls within the Act’s
purpose. It issues an injunction that bars Dan from violating the Smith
Act, quoting the Act’s prohibition.
Dan subsequently brings a bicycle into the park. Because the bicycle is
not motorized, Dan did not violate the Smith Act itself under the judge’s
purposivist interpretation. But if a court used textualism to interpret the
injunction, it would conclude that Dan violated the provision within the
injunction that quotes the Act, because a bicycle is within the ordinary
meaning of the word “vehicle.” By changing the interpretive
methodology it uses to construe the language at issue, the court could hold
Dan in contempt for violating the injunction, even though his acts would
not have violated the statute that the injunction is purportedly enforcing.
This potential divergence in interpretations of the same statutory
language creates a risk of uncertainty for entities subject to injunctions. It
is also incoherent. The meaning of a legal provision does not change when
it is incorporated into an injunction;197 the injunction is simply a
mechanism for enforcing that extrinsic authority. Thus, a court should
apply the same methodology to interpret a legal provision, regardless of
whether it is construing the provision itself or language from the provision
that is quoted or incorporated by reference into an injunction.198
196
See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
593, 607 (1958) (first proposing this famous example).
197
Cf. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380 (2005) (“It is not at all unusual to give a statute’s
ambiguous language a limiting construction called for by one of the statute’s applications,
even though other of the statute’s applications, standing alone, would not support the same
limitation. The lowest common denominator, as it were, must govern.”); Leocal v.
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (explaining that, if a statute has criminal and civil
applications, courts “must interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its
application in a criminal or noncriminal context”).
198
See, e.g., Matter of Rimsat, Ltd., 98 F.3d 956, 965 (7th Cir. 1996) (interpreting an
injunction that quoted § 543(b) of the Bankruptcy Code by construing that provision of the
Code).

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1098

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 107:1059

This principle means that, even though a court should generally apply
textualism to injunctions, it should interpret provisions within an
injunction that quote or incorporate an extrinsic legal authority with
whatever interpretive theory it would ordinarily apply to that type of
authority. For example, if a court would use purposivism to interpret a
statute, it should use purposivism to interpret provisions of an injunction
that quote or cite that statute. Textualism would still apply, however,
where a court chooses to state a party’s legal obligations in its own words,
paraphrase the underlying legal authority, or impose prophylactic
restrictions that go beyond that underlying authority. In such cases,
textualism remains the appropriate interpretive approach because, rather
than merely incorporating a pre-existing extrinsic source of legal
obligations, the court is choosing to craft its own.
This recommendation leads to the uncomfortable conclusion that a
court may have to apply different methodologies to different provisions
within an injunction. This approach aligns with the Supreme Court’s
directive on how to interpret regulations that incorporate underlying
statutory provisions, however. Ordinarily, a court must defer under Auer
v. Robbins to a federal agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.199
But in Gonzales v. Oregon, the Court held that this deference does not
extend to an agency’s construction of regulations that merely reiterate or
quote statutory provisions.200 Rather, a court must construe such
regulations in the same manner it would interpret the underlying
statutes.201 In other words, the approach that a court must apply to
199
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1997) (holding that an agency’s interpretation
of its own regulation that reflects its “fair and considered judgment on the matter in question”
is “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,’” even if the
agency adopted that interpretation without notice-and-comment rulemaking and
communicated it in an amicus brief (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989))); see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2418 (2019) (holding
that Auer deference “enables the agency to fill out the regulatory scheme Congress has placed
under its supervision,” but cautioning that “th[e] Court has cabined Auer’s scope in varied and
critical ways”); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (providing
that, when a regulation’s “meaning . . . is in doubt,” the agency’s interpretation “becomes of
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”).
200
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (“An agency does not acquire special
authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to
formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.”). But see
Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Anti-Parroting Canon, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 292, 311 (2011)
(“[T]he fact that a statute and a regulation use the same words should not always lead to the
conclusion that they mean the same thing.”).
201
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257.
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interpret statutory language does not change simply because an agency
incorporates that language into a regulation.202 The same reasoning
applies to statutory language and other legal authorities that a court
incorporates into an injunction.
To be sure, applying a method other than textualism to interpret certain
provisions of an injunction loses the benefits of textualism for those
provisions. And applying different interpretive methodologies to different
provisions within an injunction can be confusing and complicated. While
no perfect solutions exist, applying this modified or hybrid form of
textualism appears to best balance all of the competing considerations.
This approach incorporates textualism as a default rule to promote notice
to the enjoined party, limit opportunities for judicial abuse, and comply
with Rule 65 and its state analogies.203 Yet it allows provisions within
injunctions that quote or incorporate by reference extrinsic legal
authorities to be interpreted by whatever methodology the court would
ordinarily use to construe those authorities, to preserve their meaning and
ensure that they are interpreted consistently.
The risks of departing from a textualist approach when construing
outside authorities are limited. Unlike an injunction, which is drafted by
the court, those other legal sources will have been drafted by someone
else—be it a constitutional convention, legislature, agency, testator, or
even the parties themselves. Similarly, unlike injunctions, those
documents generally do not target the enjoined individual. Additionally,
at least some precedent for applying such a hybrid approach exists in the
Court’s approach to interpreting federal regulations.204 Finally, when an
injunction incorporates an extrinsic legal provision, it should be
understood as imposing whatever legal obligations that extrinsic
provision creates. If the court wishes to impose legal obligations that
differ from those established by some extrinsic authority, it may craft its
own language for the injunction, rather than merely quoting or
incorporating that authority by reference. Thus, courts should apply a
modified textualist approach to interpret injunctions.

202

Id.
See supra Section II.A.
204
See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
203
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B. Extending the Theory to All Types of Injunctions
To this point, our argument has focused on permanent injunctions.
Injunctions come in many forms, however, including not only permanent
injunctions, but temporary restraining orders (TROs), preliminary
injunctions, and consent decrees, as well.
This Section argues that textualism should apply to injunctions of all
types. It begins by demonstrating that a single interpretive theory should
apply to all injunctions, regardless of their temporal duration. It then
establishes that the same theory should likewise extend to consent decrees
created by the parties, as well.
1. Permanent v. Interlocutory Injunctions
Despite the temporal differences among temporary restraining orders
(“TROs”), preliminary injunctions, and permanent injunctions, the same
interpretive theory should apply to all of them, for two reasons. First,
permanent injunctions are virtually identical to both types of interlocutory
injunctions. The primary difference among the three types of orders is the
time frame for which each remains in effect. Permanent and interlocutory
injunctions are governed by nearly the same elements.205 Both are issued
by trial courts against a defendant to enforce the plaintiff’s legal rights or
prevent violations of certain legal restrictions. Both oblige a defendant to
act, or refrain from acting, and both are subject to modification or
vacation on similar grounds.206 More importantly, a court may hold a
person in contempt for violating either an interlocutory injunction or a
permanent injunction. Interlocutory injunctions thus present the same
notice and risk-of-abuse considerations that support modified textualism
for permanent injunctions.
Nothing about the transitory nature of an interlocutory temporary
injunction calls for a different interpretive approach. The interim nature
of temporary injunctions goes only to the timeframe in which a person is
subject to obligations; it does not change a person’s duty to comply with
the obligations those orders create or the consequences for failing to do
so.

205
206

See supra note 27.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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Second, applying different interpretive methods to interlocutory and
permanent injunctions would have odd and undesirable results.207 If a
plaintiff won a preliminary injunction, a court would not necessarily be
able to simply confirm or extend the order through a permanent injunction
if different interpretive methodologies applied to different types of
injunctions. Applying a different theory to permanent injunctions could
affect the injunction’s scope and, accordingly, require the parties to
change their conduct. If a court wished to impose the same conditions as
those in the interlocutory injunction, it may have to modify the
injunction’s terms—an inefficient and counterintuitive requirement, to
say the least.
One might argue that, since TROs are issued ex parte and often drafted
in emergency situations under extreme time pressure,208 courts should be
willing to construe them more liberally. The harried circumstances under
which some TROs are created may cause courts to draft them imprecisely,
or in a way that inadequately prevents irreparable injury. Thus, one might
say, a more flexible method of interpretation should apply.
But the circumstances under which TROs are often drafted support a
textualist approach even more strongly. Because courts may issue TROs
ex parte, the parties to be enjoined may not be afforded an opportunity to
explain their position or hear the judge’s explanation for the order.
Textualism combats these problems to some degree by providing greater
notice to the restrained parties and constraining the judge’s discretion in
enforcing the order.
2. Injunctions v. Consent Decrees
Consent decrees are hybrids of injunctions and contracts.209 Like
contracts, they are agreements struck by the parties.210 But they are

207
Cf. Morley, Beyond the Elements, supra note 26, at 477 (discussing “[t]he need for
consistency between the standards for preliminary and permanent injunctions”).
208
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
209
Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986)
(holding that consent decrees are “hybrid[s]” that can be characterized as both contracts and
judgments). But see Thomas M. Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms: Models Without
Meaning, 29 B.C. L. Rev. 291 (1988) (arguing that a consent decree cannot be treated either
as a traditional contract or court order).
210
Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 519 (“[B]ecause their terms are arrived at through mutual
agreement of the parties, consent decrees also closely resemble contracts.”).
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adopted as injunctions by the court, and they are enforceable through the
contempt power.211
One might argue that, because consent decrees derive from contracts,
courts should interpret them using the same methodology they would
apply to other contracts. The Supreme Court advocated this approach in
United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co.212 The Court declared that a
consent decree “is to be construed for enforcement purposes basically as
a contract.”213 Accordingly, courts may look to the “circumstances
surrounding the formation of the consent order,” as it would with other
contracts, instead of focusing only on the text of the decree.214
ITT Continental Baking adopted the wrong interpretive approach.
Courts should interpret consent decrees the same way they would other
types of injunctions, rather than treating such orders as contracts, for
several reasons. First, although a consent decree arises from the parties’
consent, it is fundamentally a court order.215 Violating a consent decree is
not simply a breach of contract. To the contrary, such acts subject a
violator to the possibility of contempt, raising the same notice and riskof-abuse concerns as other injunctions. Accordingly, consent decrees
should be construed according to the same principles as other injunctions.
Indeed, as the dissent in ITT Continental Baking explained, that had been
the law before the majority’s decision.216
Second, applying a distinct interpretive methodology only to consent
decrees would create uncertainty and raise the information cost of
accurately determining their meaning. It may not always be apparent from
211
See, e.g., EEOC v. Local 580, Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental
Ironworkers, 925 F.2d 588, 594 (2d Cir. 1991).
212
420 U.S. 223 (1975).
213
Id. at 238.
214
Id.
215
See Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 518 (agreeing that a “consent decree looks like and is
entered as a judgment”).
216
ITT Continental Baking, 420 U.S. at 247 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority
of “proclaim[ing] a new rule of construction for consent orders or decrees” that was “totally
at odds with our previous decisions” and “directly contrary” to precedents allowing a court to
consider only the “four corners” of a consent decree); see also United States v. Armour & Co.,
402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971) (“[T]he scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four
corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it.”);
United States v. Atl. Refin. Co., 360 U.S. 19, 23–24 (1959) (interpreting language in a consent
decree based on its “normal meaning,” rather than adopting “another reading” which “might
seem more consistent with the Government’s reasons for entering into the agreement in the
first place”); Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353, 356–57 (1952) (applying plain-meaning
interpretation of consent decree).
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the face of a court order whether it is a consent decree, especially to third
parties who are subject to it.217 And if federal courts treated consent
decrees as contracts subject to state-law principles of contract
interpretation,218 it might not be apparent which state’s law applies.219
Indeed, in a few cases, the meaning of the decree itself might even change
based on completely unrelated developments in state contract law.
Treating consent decrees differently from other types of injunctions
would therefore create unnecessary uncertainty.
Third, the fact that multiple parties contribute to the creation of consent
decrees supports a textualist approach. A court may enter a consent decree
only if the plaintiff, the defendant, and the court itself agree to its terms.
Each of those entities has its own set of interests, goals, and
responsibilities. Because a consent decree reflects a compromise among
multiple parties,220 it does not embody a single purpose, intent, or
policy.221 Textualism requires courts to respect and enforce that
compromise.222
Complications can arise, of course, if a consent decree quotes from, or
cites to, a separate settlement agreement. A settlement agreement is
217

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2).
Alternatively, federal courts could create a body of federal common law principles for
interpreting consent decrees. Creating such a unique interpretive regime distinct from the law
governing other types of injunctions seems unnecessarily duplicative, complicated, and
burdensome. And any such body of federal common law is likely to be plagued with the same
inconsistencies and indeterminacy as the law governing constitutional and statutory
interpretation.
219
Differences in contract law among the states could substantially impact a consent
decree’s proper interpretation. For example, states differ on whether contracts must be
construed in light of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing; states that have recognized
such a duty have adopted different approaches on how to construe and apply it. See Richard
A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Individual Employment Rights:
Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Reconciliation, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 687, 751 (1997) (“[S]ome
but not all states imply a duty of good faith and fair dealing into every contract . . . .”); Thomas
A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards for Evaluating When the Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the Mystery, 47
Hastings L.J. 585, 590 (1990) (“[A]uthorities differ about the methodology for determining
whether conduct violates the covenant [of good faith].”).
220
Armour & Co., 402 U.S. at 681.
221
Id. at 681–82 (“[T]he decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose; rather the parties
have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant decree embodies as much of
those opposing purposes as the respective parties have the bargaining power and skill to
achieve.”).
222
See Manning, supra note 15, at 70–71, 74 (advocating for textualism because legislation
embodies a compromise); see also Easterbrook, supra note 159, at 63 (noting that a nontextualist interpretative approach ignores that “laws are born of compromise”).
218
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simply a contract.223 Under our recommended approach of modified
textualism, a court would therefore interpret provisions within the consent
decree that quote from, or otherwise incorporate, the settlement
agreement based on whatever methodology it would ordinarily apply to
contracts. It would apply textualism to the decree’s other provisions.
Courts can eliminate the need for such a complicated approach in at least
two ways.
Most basically, the fact that the parties are able to resolve their dispute
through a settlement agreement may be a reason for a court to refuse to
enter a consent decree, as well.224 Alternatively, the parties and court may
ensure that the same interpretive theory applies to the entire decree by
including only substantive provisions that quote from, or otherwise
incorporate, the settlement agreement. Modified textualism allows the
parties themselves to determine whether differing interpretive theories
would apply to different parts of the decree, based on how they draft it.
C. Non-Textual Considerations at the Remedial Stage
Although modified textualism is the appropriate method for
interpreting injunctions, non-textual considerations—such as the policies
motivating the injunction—still have a role to play at the remedial stage,
when the court decides whether to impose contempt sanctions. A court’s
decision whether to hold a violator in contempt is separate from its
threshold determination that the injunction has been violated. Courts have
broad equitable discretion over the imposition of contempt sanctions.225
In exercising that discretion, a court may consider, among other things,
the nature of the violation, the need to deter future violations, mitigating
factors, and whether the defendant’s conduct frustrated the injunction’s
purposes or undermined its goals.226 A court need not hold a violator in
223
See Michael T. Morley, Consent of the Governed or Consent of the Government? The
Problems with Consent Decrees in Government-Defendant Cases, 16 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 637,
663–64 (2014).
224
Id. at 682–88.
225
See, e.g., Islamic Inv. Co. of the Gulf (Bah.) Ltd. v. Harper, 545 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir.
2008) (explaining that “even if all of [the] conditions [for contempt] are satisfied, the trial
court retains a certain negative discretion . . . to eschew the imposition of a contempt
sanction . . . in the interests of justice”); Trials, 45 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 569, 683
(2016) (“Courts have broad discretion in finding civil contempt and in imposing
sanctions . . . .”).
226
See United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 303 (1947) (“In
imposing a fine for criminal contempt, the trial judge may properly take into consideration the
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contempt if it concludes that contempt would not advance the policies
underlying the injunction or would be inconsistent with the judge’s
purposes or intent when she entered it.
Under our recommended approach, a party could not be held in
contempt unless its conduct violated the ordinary meaning of the
injunction. In other words, modified textualism determines the
injunction’s outer boundaries.227 Allowing the court to consider
purposivist and other such factors at the remedial stage, however,
provides an additional protection against overbroad injunctions. Once a
contempt motion has passed through a textualist sieve, applying
purposivism would only work to a respondent’s advantage, shielding it
from liability for engaging in acts that, while contrary to the injunction,
do not actually further its purposes or threaten the values underlying it.228
Applied in this manner, purposivism would be a one-way ratchet: it
could be used only to narrow, and never expand, the scope of a
respondent’s liability under an injunction. Considering such non-textual
factors in deciding whether to impose contempt is an appropriate exercise
of courts’ traditionally broad equitable remedial discretion. Indeed,
American courts applied a comparable approach when enforcing criminal
laws in the late eighteenth century.229 A hybrid approach of textualism at
extent of the willful and deliberate defiance of the court’s order, the seriousness of the
consequences of the contumacious behavior, the necessity of effectively terminating the
defendant’s defiance as required by the public interest, and the importance of deterring such
acts in the future.”); e.g., United States v. Henderson, No. CR 10-117 BDB, 2012 WL 787575,
at *3 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 9, 2012) (“In exercising that discretion, the Court will consider factors
such as the egregiousness of the violation, the extent to which the disclosure maligned
Petitioner’s reputation, and any countervailing considerations that might have supported the
disclosure or that militate against imposition of the severe sanction of contempt.”).
227
See, e.g., Angiodynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG, 946 F. Supp. 2d 205, 213 (D. Mass. 2013)
(“The text of a court order determines its power over parties. To allow parties to independently
deduce the purpose of a court order and determine what acts would be most in line with the
purpose—regardless of the text—would make this court irrelevant.”).
228
See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. Peabody Coal Co., 7 F. App’x 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(affirming trial court’s refusal to hold a party in contempt for violating an injunction, because
the party’s actions “did not thwart a purpose behind any of the [trial court’s] orders” (citing
In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., 10 F.3d 693, 694–95 (9th Cir.
1993))).
229
The original form of the rule of lenity specified that courts could not extend a criminal
statute beyond its text, but could narrow the statute in favor of defendants by considering its
purpose. See, e.g., State v. Norfolk S. R.R. Co., 82 S.E. 963, 966 (N.C. 1914) (“It is an ancient,
but just and equitable, doctrine which extends a penal statute beyond its words in favor of a
defendant, while holding it tightly to its words against him.”); 1 William A. Hawkins, Treatise
of the Pleas of the Crown, ch. 30, § 8, at 77 (1st ed. 1712) (“Penal Statutes are construed
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the interpretation stage and purposivism at the remedial stage draws on
the strengths of each theory while minimizing the drawbacks of each
methodology when applied individually.
IV. APPELLATE REVIEW OF TRIAL-COURT INTERPRETATIONS
A separate, but related, question from the proper method for
interpreting injunctions is how appellate courts should review trial courts’
interpretations of them. Appellate courts have disagreed on the proper
standard of review. Some courts have concluded that an injunction’s
meaning is a question of law that the appellate court should review de
novo, like most other questions of law.230 Other appellate courts, in
contrast, have deferred to trial courts’ interpretations, at least when the
trial judge who interpreted the injunction is the same one who issued it.231
This Part proposes that appellate courts review injunctions de novo.
Plenary appellate review promotes the same interests that support
textualism as a theory for interpreting injunctions. It is also more effective
than a deferential approach at ensuring that the judiciary correctly

strictly against the Subject, and favuorably and equitably for him.”). The rule thus called for
different methods of interpretation: textualism to prevent the extension of criminal statutes
and purposivism to narrow them.
Such blending of methodologies is uncommon, if not disfavored, today, because each
method of interpretation rests on a different set of assumptions and principles. Our proposal
avoids this difficulty by permitting courts to consider purpose and other non-textual methods
only at the remedial stage, after the court has determined that the text of the injunction has
been violated.
230
Abbott Labs. v. TorPharm, Inc., 503 F.3d 1372, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[I]nterpretation
of the terms of an injunction is a question of law we review de novo.”).
231
See, e.g., In re Managed Care, 756 F.3d 1222, 1234 (11th Cir. 2014) (concluding that an
appellate court should give “great deference” to a judge’s interpretation of an injunction that
he entered); Schering Corp. v. Ill. Antibiotics Co., 62 F.3d 903, 908 (7th Cir. 1995) (“When
the district judge who is being asked to interpret an injunction is the same judge who entered
it . . . , we should give particularly heavy weight to the district court’s interpretation.”);
Hensley v. Bd. of Educ. of Unified Sch. Dist. No. 443, Ford Cnty., 504 P.2d 184, 188 (Kan.
1972) (“When the same trial judge who entered an injunction order hears a later contempt
proceeding based on violation of that injunction the interpretation . . . will generally be
followed by the appellate court.”); see also Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 762 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that “the construction given to an injunction by the issuing
judge . . . is entitled to great weight” (quoting Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S.
753, 795 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part))). It should
be noted that Justice Scalia’s endorsement of deferential review is at least somewhat in tension
with his concern that allowing the judge who entered an injunction to determine whether that
injunction was violated is a recipe for abuse. See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 840 (1994) (Scalia, J. concurring).
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interprets the text of injunctions. Finally, the traditional reasons in favor
of appellate deference do not justify deferential review of trial courts’
interpretations of injunctions.
A. Promoting Textualism’s Goals
The very interests that support textualism to interpret injunctions—
providing notice, preventing judicial abuse, and ensuring compliance with
rules that require courts to draft injunctions with specificity—support de
novo appellate review of their meaning. De novo review is more effective
than deference at ensuring that an injunction provides enjoined parties
with adequate notice of the conduct that the order requires or prohibits.
Plenary review requires an appellate court to provide its own independent
interpretation of an injunction.232 The court looks at the injunction with
fresh eyes, free of the possible biases, implicit assumptions, and personal
knowledge of authorial intent with which a document’s author reads it.
Allowing appellate courts to adopt the interpretation they deem most
accurate ensures that an injunction is reasonably clear to third parties
other than its author. In articulating its understanding of the injunction, an
appellate court will often flesh out the order’s meaning and provide details
about how it will operate in the future.233 Moreover, this type of careful
evaluation of the injunction’s language is more likely than a deferential
standard of review to detect ambiguities, vagueness, or other potential
shortcomings. In contrast, when an appellate court accords deference to
the trial court’s interpretation of an injunction, its task is not to ascertain
the order’s meaning. Instead, the appellate court must simply determine
whether the trial court’s interpretation falls within an acceptable range.234
This review is unlikely to entail the same level of rigorous evaluation of
the injunction’s language and is less likely to result in an opinion fleshing
out its details. Accordingly, deferential review is far less effective in

232

See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory L.J. 747, 758 (1982)
(stating that plenary review is necessary to achieve consistency in the law).
233
See id.; Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now (“ACORN”) v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections,
75 F.3d 304, 306 (7th Cir. 1996) (observing that the interpretation of an injunction
“clarifies . . . the injunction”).
234
Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 Ind. L.J. 49, 55 (2010) (“[D]eferential
standards . . . mean that reversal often does not follow from an appellate court’s conclusion
that it would have implemented the applicable law differently were it the decision maker in
the first instance.”).
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ensuring adequate ex ante notice to defendants of the conduct an
injunction requires or proscribes.
For similar reasons, de novo review also helps prevent abusive
enforcement of injunctions. Injunctions create an acute risk of abuse
because the judge who interprets and enforces an order is often the same
person who entered it. That concentration of power can easily result in
applications that reflect the judge’s unarticulated intentions or
understanding rather than a fair interpretation of the injunction’s text.
More concerningly, a judge may treat an alleged violation of an injunction
that he or she entered as a personal affront.
De novo appellate review ameliorates this problem because the
appellate court’s interpretation trumps that of the trial court. The appellate
court does not have the same personal investment or stake in the order
that could lead to biased interpretation or enforcement. Deferential review
is far less effective in curtailing abuse because the appellate court must
uphold any of a range of potential interpretations.
Plenary review also gives trial courts greater incentive to be more
careful and precise in their language. If trial judges know that appellate
courts will carefully scrutinize an injunction’s language rather than
upholding any reasonable interpretation, they are more likely to craft their
orders precisely and clearly, as required by Rule 65 and its state-law
analogues.235
De novo review would also result in a more coherent textualist
approach to interpreting injunctions. Textualism posits that most texts
have a single best interpretation.236 But because they are human, judges
may occasionally err in trying to ascertain that meaning. A judge may
erroneously conclude that one reading of an injunction is more faithful to
the text than a different interpretation. Appellate courts may be less likely

235

Cf. Jeffrey M. Surprenant, Comment, Pulling the Reins on Chevron, 65 Loy. L. Rev.
399, 420 (2019) (“[E]mploying a de novo review would encourage both legislative drafters
and their agency helpers to write clear statutes that will withstand judicial scrutiny.”);
Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron—The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
821, 824 (1990) (stating that Chevron should lead Congress to be more careful in drafting laws
when it wants to avoid delegation).
236
Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory Precedents, 104 Va. L. Rev. 157, 204
(2018) (“Textualist judges, particularly in the post-Scalia era, tend to presume that there is a
correct, definitive answer to every (or nearly every) interpretive question . . . .”); see also
Christine Kexel Chabot, Selling Chevron, 67 Admin. L. Rev. 481, 509 (2015) (“[T]extualists
assume Congress has provided a single, objectively determinable meaning in statutory text.”).
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to commit these errors than trial courts.237 Unlike trial judges, appellate
judges do not have to make decisions alone in the trenches but enjoy time
to reflect and deliberate with their colleagues.238 They also have the
benefits of, among other things, the trial court’s interpretation and more
briefing of the issues by the parties.239 A deferential review scheme would
limit the power of the appellate courts to correct trial courts’ errors by
directing them to uphold interpretations that do not reflect the best reading
of an injunction’s text. By contrast, plenary review would empower
appellate courts to ensure that injunctions are given their best textual
interpretation.240
B. Against Deference
Appellate courts defer to other entities’ legal conclusions for two basic
reasons.241 Most basically, the law may require the appellate court to
defer.242 Alternatively, an appellate court may defer to another’s
interpretation for epistemic reasons, if the court believes that the other
interpreter is more likely to reach a correct result.243 Neither of these
rationales requires appellate deference to trial courts’ interpretations of
injunctions.
First, laws often require courts to defer to interpretations rendered by
others.244 For example, Chevron deference requires courts to defer to
reasonable agency interpretations of statutes that they administer.245 The
Court’s current justification for Chevron deference is that a statutory grant
237

William Ortman, Rulemaking’s Missing Tier, 68 Ala. L. Rev. 225, 246 (2016)
(identifying various “structural epistemic advantages” that “reduce the likelihood of legal
error” by the appellate courts).
238
See Marin K. Levy, Visiting Judges, 107 Calif. L. Rev. 67, 139 (2019) (noting the
pressures faced by district judges and not appellate judges).
239
See Ortman, supra note 237, at 247–48
240
In arguing that appellate courts should review interpretations de novo, we do not mean
to say that appellate courts should review de novo the decision to impose contempt for
violations. An injunction’s proper interpretation is a question of law. It is distinct from the
subsequent question of whether to hold a person who has violated the injunction in contempt.
Decisions about whether to impose contempt sanctions on violators depend on a myriad of
factors. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. An appellate court should overturn that
decision only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Perez v. Danbury Hosp., 347 F.3d 419,
423 (2d Cir. 2003) (reviewing a “finding of contempt under an abuse of discretion standard”).
241
Horwitz, supra note 17, at 1078.
242
See id. at 1078–85.
243
See id. at 1085–90.
244
See id. at 1072–78.
245
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
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of authority to a federal agency to administer or enforce a federal law by
promulgating regulations implicitly includes the primary power to
interpret that law.246 Accordingly, courts must defer to agencies’
interpretations of such laws.247 The Court has invoked similar reasoning
to justify Auer deference,248 which requires courts to defer to agencies’
interpretations of their own regulations.249
This authority-based rationale does not apply to injunctions. No
statutes currently in force require appellate courts to defer to lower courts’
interpretations of injunctions. Nor is there a historical practice from which
one can infer an implicit obligation to defer.250 The issue did not even
arise in eighteenth century England, because litigants could not appeal the
Chancellor’s decisions concerning equitable relief.251 Thus, there is no
authority-based rationale for requiring appellate courts to defer to trial
courts’ interpretations of injunctions.
Appellate courts also sometimes defer to conclusions rendered by
others who are better-positioned to know about the issues at stake.252
These sorts of epistemic reasons underlie appellate deference to trial
courts’ findings of fact. Because the trial court listens to the witnesses,
observes their demeanor, and immerses itself in the evidence, it is in a
246

See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996) (“We accord deference
to agencies under Chevron . . . because of a presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity
in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be
resolved, first and foremost, by the agency . . . .”); see also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference
to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 515 (1989) (providing a similar
justification for Chevron deference).
247
Smiley, 517 U.S. at 740–71.
248
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
249
See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2412 (2019) (plurality opinion) (“We have
explained Auer deference (as we now call it) as rooted in a presumption about congressional
intent—a presumption that Congress would generally want the agency to play the primary role
in resolving regulatory ambiguities.”). A closely related justification for deference to agencies
that the Kisor Court identified is that interpreting federal laws necessarily involves policy
decisions which Congress has empowered agencies to make. Id. at 2413. There is no
comparable assignment of policy-making authority to federal trial courts. More importantly,
contempt proceedings are held after an alleged violation of an injunction has occurred.
Allowing trial courts to implement policy considerations when interpreting an injunction at
that late point would acutely raise the notice and abuse problems outlined earlier.
250
Cf. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, SA v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318
(1999) (explaining that federal courts’ equity powers are limited by the historical practices of
the English Court of Chancery).
251
Bray, supra note 4, at 446 (“There was no appeal from the Chancellor . . . .”).
252
Horwitz, supra note 17, at 1085 (“The second basic justification for judicial deference is
not grounded on the legal authority of the institution to which the courts defer, but rather on
its epistemic authority.”).

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2021]

Interpreting Injunctions

1111

better position to draw correct factual conclusions than an appellate court
reviewing a cold record.253 Some appellate courts have invoked these
reasons to defer to trial courts’ interpretations of the injunctions they
enter.254 As the Seventh Circuit put it, “when the document is an order,
the court . . . that issued it is, sensibly enough, considered to have special
insight into its meaning.”255
Deference, for this reason, would make sense under an intentionalist
theory of interpretation, because the injunction’s meaning would depend
on the factual question of what the trial judge intended when she entered
it. And the trial judge herself is in the best position to know what she
meant. The Supreme Court recently invoked this line of reasoning in
Kisor v. Wilkie to justify Auer deference, which requires a court to defer
to an agency’s interpretations of regulations that the agency itself
promulgated.256 The Court stated that, as the entity that drafts a regulation,
an agency “will often have direct insight into what that rule was intended
to mean,” and “know what it was supposed to include or exclude or how
it was supposed to apply to some problem.”257
But these sorts of epistemic considerations provide much less support
for appellate deference under a textualist theory of interpretation.
Textualism requires courts to interpret legal provisions based on how a
reasonable person would understand their text. That determination does
not require any special expertise. The relevant inquiry is how an ordinary
person, not a specialist, would understand the text. This is not to say that
the trial court’s determination is useless to a textualist. Trial judges are
presumptively reasonable people who are informed about the
circumstances surrounding the injunctions they issue, and their
interpretations accordingly are evidence of how a reasonable person
might interpret those texts.258 From a textualist perspective, however, a
253

See United States ex rel. Graham v. Mancusi, 457 F.2d 463, 469–70 (2d Cir. 1972)
(Friendly, J.) (“It would still be for the judge who saw and heard the witnesses at the trial or,
better, another judge who would see and hear them without having been exposed to the illegal
evidence, to determine where the truth lay—not for appellate judges reading a cold record.”);
see also Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 555 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[H]aving viewed
the trial first hand [the trial judge] is in a better position to evaluate the evidence than a judge
reviewing a cold record.”).
254
See, e.g., Emps. Ins. of Wausau v. Browner, 52 F.3d 656, 666 (7th Cir. 1995).
255
Id.
256
139 S. Ct. 2400, 2412 (2019).
257
Id.
258
John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional
Adjudication, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1337, 1355 (1998) (arguing that textualists can consider
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trial judge does not occupy a privileged position in determining an
injunction’s ordinary meaning that would warrant deference.
One might argue that, even if appellate courts should not give strong
deference to trial-court interpretations of injunctions, the trial court’s
expertise entitles it to a lesser type of non-binding deference, akin to
Skidmore deference.259 On this view, appellate courts should defer only
to the extent that they find a trial court’s interpretation persuasive, based
on considerations such as the reason for the trial court’s interpretation, the
thoroughness of the rationale supporting that decision, and the
consistency of the trial court’s interpretation over time.260 But this softer
deference also is not warranted.
To start, as noted above, the expertise of a trial court is not central to
determining the meaning of an injunction under a textualist approach.
Textualism asks how non-experts would understand the injunction’s
terms. Moreover, appellate review is one of the major ways to combat the
threat of vindictive or otherwise abusive interpretations. De novo review
empowers appellate courts to assess for themselves whether the trial
court’s interpretation is correct. Affording even non-binding deference
would weaken that check, granting trial courts have more leeway and
thereby increasing the odds of abuse.
CONCLUSION
Injunctions are among the most powerful tools in a judge’s arsenal.
They can impose significant obligations, which courts may enforce
through the contempt power. Because structural protections such as
separation of powers do not apply to injunctions, they present a significant
opportunity for judicial abuse.
To minimize these concerns, courts should employ modified
textualism to interpret injunctions. A textualist approach would result in
parties having more notice of their obligations under injunctions. Instead
other people’s interpretations of a statute, because “the way reasonable persons actually
understood a text” can be useful evidence of the text’s meaning, particularly “if those persons
had special familiarity with the temper and events of the times that produced that text”); see
also Kent Greenawalt, The Nature of Rules and the Meaning of Meaning, 72 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1449, 1451 (1997) (discussing the evidentiary value of other people’s interpretations of
a text).
259
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
260
Id.; cf. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1235, 1238 (2007) (“Skidmore’s sliding scale encompasses
three zones or ‘moods’ reflecting strong, intermediate, and weak or no deference.”).
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of turning on the unspoken goals or policies of the issuing judge, the
defendant’s duties would depend only on the ordinary understanding of
the injunction’s terms. Textualism would also combat the threat of
judicial abuse, because the terms of the injunction would define the
circumstances under which a judge could hold a person in contempt. A
textualist approach is also most consistent with rules, such as Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2) and its state analogues, which require courts
to draft injunctions with specificity.
We recommend a “modified” form of textualism, however, to address
the difficult case where certain provisions within an injunction quote or
incorporate by reference an extrinsic legal authority such as a statute or
contractual provision. A court should interpret such terms in injunctions
according to whatever interpretive methodology it would ordinarily apply
to authorities of that nature, rather than textualism. Thus, a court might
apply different interpretive theories to different provisions within an
injunction. This modified textualism ensures that courts interpret legal
provisions consistently, regardless of whether the court is construing the
provision directly, or instead determining its meaning as it appears in an
injunction. While modified textualism should determine an injunction’s
meaning, the court may still take purposivist concerns into account at the
remedial stage in deciding whether to hold a defendant who violated an
injunction in contempt. The same reasons that support adopting modified
textualism as the proper theory for interpreting injunctions also suggest
that appellate courts should review trial courts’ interpretations de novo.
Plenary review would tend over time to increase the clarity of injunctions
and reduce the threat of abuse by providing robust appellate oversight of
trial judges’ interpretations.

